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Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in 
Compliance for Broker-Dealers 
James A. Fanto∗ 
This Article argues that the compliance officer should play a major 
role in the ongoing reform of broker-dealers and other financial firms. 
This role is facilitated by the fact that compliance is now well established 
and accepted and compliance officers are close to decision making at all 
levels of a firm. The contention is that the role of compliance must be 
rethought and reoriented if it is to contribute fully to the reform. 
Compliance officers now ensure that the firms and their employees 
comply with the numerous laws and regulations governing them and 
their activities, primarily by producing and then revising detailed 
compliance procedures and policies, and monitoring compliance with 
them. The policies and procedures direct the conduct of employees by 
surrounding them with a web of detailed instructions, procedures, 
supervisory review, reporting, oversight, and investigation, where 
necessary. This approach, which is based on a well-established “external” 
model of direction, discipline, and surveillance, is necessary to prevent 
self-interested and opportunistic conduct by financial firm employees. 
However, there is a risk that employees follow only the letter of 
compliance and at times ignore it altogether because they understand 
that the rules are different from, and secondary to, the actual securities 
business. Moreover, the external approach “crowds out” another model 
that is necessary to achieve the most effective compliance: Ideal broker-
dealer compliance would promote “internal,” in addition to external, 
compliance. The goal of the internal approach is to have firm employees 
internalize the policies of the laws and regulations and the professional 
and ethical standards so that they come into the foreground when the 
 
∗ Gerald Baylin Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of 
Business Law & Regulation, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank William Araiza, 
Miriam Baer, Anita Bernstein, Steven Dean, Cynthia Godsoe, Edward Janger, Roberta Karmel, 
Arthur Laby, Gregg Macey, Minor Myers, David Reiss, Larry Solan, and Nelson Tebbe for 
their comments on this Article. I am also grateful for comments offered to me by participants 
during a conference on “The Growth and Importance of Compliance in Financial Firms: 
Meaning and Implications,” sponsored by Brooklyn Law School’s Center for the Study of 
Business Law & Regulation, held on Feb. 8, 2013, where I gave a talk based on views 
expressed in this Article. 
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employees are making business decisions. In psychological terms, the 
internal model of compliance would ensure that the policies and 
standards do not “fade” in employee decision making. Thus a 
compliance officer, rather than being only a transcriber of rules and 
monitor of their enforcement, would be an educator about policies, 
standards, and the appropriate firm and industry culture, as well as 
an advisor and counselor concerning how they should inform daily 
employee decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A key participant in the reform of broker-dealers and other 
financial firms in response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 is the 
compliance officer, whose basic task is to ensure that a financial firm 
and its employees comply with applicable laws and regulations. The 
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compliance officer typically occupies a middle position between 
business and regulation. On the one hand, the officer does not 
engage in the firm’s business, but belongs to one of its oversight 
functions, like accounting, internal control, or legal. On the other 
hand, the compliance officer is not a regulator or an official of a self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”),1 although he or she may often 
have spent part of his or her career with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) or the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”).2 He or she thus does not have the complete 
independence from the securities business that comes with the 
government or self-regulatory role. 
This Article argues that the compliance officer should play a 
major role in the ongoing reform of broker-dealers and other 
financial firms. This role is facilitated by the fact that compliance is 
now well established and accepted in financial firms and compliance 
officers are close to decision making at all levels of a firm. In the 
interest of keeping the discussion manageable, this Article focuses on 
compliance only in financial firms regulated by the SEC as broker-
dealers under the Exchange Act and by FINRA, which is the SRO 
for these firms.3 The contention of this Article is that the role of 
compliance must be rethought and reoriented if it is to contribute 
 
 1. Self-regulatory organizations are essentially organizations of financial professionals 
or markets authorized under federal securities laws to regulate their own participants, with this 
regulation subject to the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(26) (2012). 
 2. FINRA, which is a union of the former self-regulatory arms of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), is a 
registered securities association under section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012). On the movement of lawyers and others 
between financial regulators and the financial industry, see Michael Smallberg, Dangerous 
Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates Risk of Regulatory Capture, PROJECT ON 
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 2 (Feb. 11, 2013) http://www.pogo.org/our-
work/reports/2013/dangerous-liaisons-revolving-door-at-sec.html (“The movement of 
people to and from the financial industry is a key feature of the SEC, and it has the potential to 
influence the agency’s culture and values.”). But see David Zaring, Against Being Against the 
Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507 (2013) (questioning the criticism of this 
phenomenon). 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012). A broker-dealer typically conducts both the functions 
of a “broker,” which acts as an agent for others in securities transactions, 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(4), and a “dealer,” which generally is in the business of making markets in securities, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5). However, this analysis could apply equally to compliance in other financial 
intermediaries, particularly registered investment advisers and swap dealers, for, as discussed 
below, broker-dealer compliance has been in existence for a long time and thus has served as a 
model for compliance in these other financial firms. 
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fully to the reform. Compliance officers now help ensure that firms 
and their employees comply with the numerous laws and regulations 
governing them and their activities, primarily by producing detailed 
compliance procedures and policies and then by revising them and 
monitoring compliance with them.4 The policies and procedures 
direct the conduct of employees by surrounding them with a web of 
detailed instructions, procedures, supervisory review, reporting, 
oversight, and investigation, where necessary. This approach, which 
is based on a well-established “external” model of direction, 
discipline, and surveillance, is necessary to prevent self-interested and 
opportunistic conduct by financial firm employees. Certainly, when 
individuals are told what to do and know that they are being 
watched, their misconduct is reduced.5 Indeed, in a theoretical sense, 
the most effective disciplinary system would be to have compliance 
officers everywhere, scrutinizing and reviewing every client 
interaction and transaction. However, this approach is impossible in 
the real world, given resource constraints in firms. 
There are other, even more significant, problems with the 
external approach to compliance. The imposition of detailed rules of 
conduct enforced by compliance officers reinforces the distinction 
between the business of the firm, on the one hand, and law and 
regulation on the other. Under the external model of compliance, 
the securities business is the world of profit-making through talent, 
discretion, and effort, whereas compliance is viewed by brokers as 
restricting this creativity and profitability through its rules, 
procedures, and monitoring. It is true that the rules have become 
ingrained into the securities business and the Chief Compliance 
Officer (“CCO”), which is required by regulation, has become a 
significant managerial position.6 However, there is a risk that 
employees follow only the letter of compliance and even at times 
ignore it, albeit at their peril, for, even in the routines of their 
business, they understand that the rules are different from, and 
necessarily secondary to, the actual securities business. Moreover, 
compliance officers monitor whether employees fulfill the obligations 
imposed by securities laws and regulations as well as SRO rules, and 
 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics 
Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 329 (1999) 
(discussing the benefits of a compliance program).  
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 46–47 (discussing FINRA Rule 3013). 
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they investigate and report violations of these rules and laws, which 
can lead to criminal or civil enforcement by the Justice Department 
(“DOJ”), the SEC, and FINRA.7 In these situations, compliance 
becomes part of enforcement and prosecution, which further 
distances compliance officers from other firm employees, who see 
them as threatening their livelihood and even their liberty. 
A significant problem with the external approach is that it 
“crowds out” another model that is necessary to achieve the most 
effective compliance. The ideal broker-dealer compliance orientation 
would promote internal, in addition to external, compliance. The 
goal of the internal approach is to have firm employees internalize 
the policies of the laws, regulations, and professional and ethical 
standards so that they come into the foreground when the 
employees are making business decisions. In psychological terms, the 
internal model of compliance would ensure that the policies and 
standards do not “fade” in employee decision making, which fading 
could occur even when firm employees are outwardly following 
compliance procedures because other concerns influence their 
decision making.8 Thus, this internal approach means that 
compliance would come from within the employee and be part of his 
or her mindset and personal identity. Rather than being a transcriber 
of rules and monitor of their enforcement, a compliance officer 
would be an educator about policies, standards, and the appropriate 
firm and industry culture, as well as an advisor and counselor 
concerning how rules can be applied in daily employee decisions in 
the firm. 
This reorientation of broker-dealer compliance to develop 
internal compliance is critical for the continued growth and 
development of finance. Finance allows capital to move to its best 
use and to address, through new financial products, risks facing all of 
us.9 The financial system appears to work best when entrepreneurs 
and financial institutions, such as broker-dealers, compete with their 
 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO 
DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69–70 (2011) (discussing “ethical” fading, 
where ethical dimensions of a decision “fade” at the time of decision making); Ann E. 
Tenbrunsel & Kristen Smith-Crowe, Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where 
We’re Going, 2 ACAD. MGT. ANNALS 545, 561 (2008) (discussing literature on the subject of 
ethical fading). 
 9. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
99–104 (2003) (discussing beneficial financial innovations). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 5:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1126 
various products and services, with the inevitable successes and 
failures that come with our economic system. In the last thirty years, 
however, certain financial firms, generally the financial 
conglomerates that included the largest broker-dealers, upended this 
system by externalizing and socializing the risks of their failure.10 
This situation in finance culminated in the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis, which started at the margins of finance with subprime lending 
done by unregulated financial firms, an activity that was then taken 
up by major financial institutions attracted by its profitability.11 In 
the worst financial crisis in modern memory, many of the largest 
financial firms failed or had to be rescued by the government; 
indeed, the financial system nearly collapsed.12 This crisis disrupted 
the essential back-and-forth flow of resources from investors to 
capital raisers, with the result that the federal government had to 
provide funds to financial institutions and market participants.13 The 
ensuing downturn in the economy created social and political unrest 
when the unemployed and the underemployed were discontented 
with, and blamed financial firms for, their difficult situation.14 
 
 10. The “classic” work setting forth this perspective is SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 
13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 189–222 
(2010). See generally SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET 
FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 52–57 (2012) (discussing the mortgage-
based products sold before the crisis). 
 11. For one narrative of how the growth in subprime lending and its toxic securities 
gradually spread throughout the financial system, see THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE UNITED STATES 3–24 (2011). 
 12. For a chronology of the financial crisis, see THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 22–35 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., eds. 2010). For a vivid, journalistic review of it, see generally ANDREW ROSS 
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON 
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009: Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED 
SYSTEM 1, 10–11 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, eds. 2009). 
 14. For a view on the origins of social disparities that appeared in the financial crisis, 
written in the middle of the crisis, see generally CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR 
MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 137–58 (2008). 
The “Occupy Wall Street” movement comes to mind, with its protest against the “1%,” which 
owns most of the assets and receives most of the income in the United States. See OCCUPY 
WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2013); see also Josh Bivens & 
Lawrence Mishel, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of 
Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 65–66 (Summer 2013) (discussing 
“rent shifting,” i.e., overcompensation, as an explanation for the growth of income in the 
financial sector). 
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In reaction, Congress produced the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) and 
regulators issued voluminous regulations based on it.15 Not 
surprisingly, the creation of new financial regulators,16 or new offices 
within existing ones,17 accompanied this growth in law and 
regulation. SROs, particularly FINRA, enhanced their own 
regulatory and enforcement capabilities as well.18 This legal and 
regulatory activity resulted in an enormous amount of new 
regulation being placed on financial firms, including broker-dealers. 
Critics of Dodd-Frank contended that legislators, regulators, and 
SROs had imposed excessive regulatory, and thus compliance, 
burdens upon the firms that would hurt firms’ flexibility and 
competitiveness.19 
Highly visible, well-functioning compliance, which helps firm 
employees make decisions animated by legal policies and professional 
and ethical standards, could save broker-dealers from this cycle of 
 
 15. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This Act and its regulations will 
be discussed from time to time in the Article. Among other things, this law brought within 
regulation activities like swaps and market participants (like hedge fund advisors) that had 
previously been unregulated, and it changed, through means such as the controversial “Volcker 
Rule,” how financial firms conducted their business. Title VII of Dodd-Frank regulated swap 
markets and swap market participants; Section 403 of Title IV of Dodd-Frank eliminated, by 
amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b), an exemption from regulation as an investment adviser that 
hedge fund advisers traditionally relied upon; and the “Volcker Rule,” section 619 of Title VI 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) prohibits bank holding companies, banks, and their affiliates 
and subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading or sponsoring or investing in hedge or 
private equity funds, subject to certain controversial exceptions. 
 16. Dodd-Frank, for example, created the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”), which is designed, among other things, to monitor the overall soundness of the 
financial system. See Dodd-Frank Act tit I §§ 111, 112, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–22. 
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection was also created within the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”) to regulate financial products and 
services from a consumer protection perspective. See Dodd-Frank Act tit X §§ 1011, 1021, 
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5511. 
 17. For example, the SEC created a new Division of Economic and Risk Analysis in 
2009 “to integrate financial economics and rigorous data analytics into the core missions of the 
SEC.” See Economic & Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin.shtml (last modified Mar. 13, 2014). 
 18. For a discussion of several FINRA actions following the crisis, see FINRA, 2008 
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: REFORMING REGULATION TO BETTER 
PROTECT INVESTORS 5 (2009) (letter of FINRA CEO, Richard G. Ketchum). 
 19. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR 
YEARS LATER 88–90 (July 2014). By contrast, one could contend that, given their misconduct, 
broker-dealers and other financial firms need more, not less, regulation. 
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crisis followed by increased regulatory burdens. It could convince 
legislators, regulators, and, most important of all, the public that 
broker-dealers contribute an important social role (i.e., capital raising) 
and are not in business only for their employees’ self-interest. Firms 
would thus need fewer express rules of conduct.20 Moreover, a 
compliance approach that changes the perspective of firm employees 
so that they consider policies behind the rules, which include the long-
term stability of the financial system and customer confidence in the 
markets, would help employees understand the potential dangers of 
certain financial products and services. It could have the added virtue 
of preventing the loss of investor and public confidence in the financial 
markets and, perhaps, the reemergence of the kinds of risks and crises 
that threaten the entire financial system.21 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief history of 
compliance in broker-dealers and its amplified importance over 
recent years as laws and regulations affecting these firms have 
increased. Part I then discusses the role and functions of the typical 
compliance department in a broker-dealer, generally as the producer, 
administrator, and enforcer of firm rules reflecting this ever-growing 
number of laws, regulations, and professional standards. 
Part II first offers an account of the origins of the current 
“external” compliance orientation, which is based upon employee 
control and monitoring. This orientation is designed to dictate in 
detail the conduct of a broker and to surround him or her with a 
web of oversight, so as to make the broker both productive and 
disciplined. Part II relies on insights about the origin and purpose of 
this disciplinary approach, particularly those by the French 
 
 20. Other reforms, such as a change in business school education, would be useful, but 
they are outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Robert A. Giacalone & Mark D. Promislo, 
Broken When Entering: The Stigmatization of Goodness and Business Ethics Education, 12 ACAD. 
MGT. LEARNING & EDUC. 86 (2013) (explaining how, before they enter business schools, 
many business students have been taught to belittle ethics and to espouse materialistic values). 
 21. This is systemic risk, which is simply a risk to the entire financial system. See LISSA L. 
BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 156 (4th ed. 2011). The kinds of problems that lead to systemic risk 
may arise slowly and from the ground up. The financial crisis was a long time coming and the 
problems in the financial system that led to it were apparent to many before it emerged. Thus, 
systemic and other massive disasters are not always due to unexpected, unforeseeable events, 
popularly known as “black swans,” defined by Nassim Taleb as events that are outside the 
realm of expectation, with a large impact, that generate an after-the-fact explanation. See 
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
xvii–xviii (2007). 
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philosopher Michel Foucault, who saw it as a technique of social 
control that emerged during the Enlightenment and that was applied 
first in the prisons and then in major social activities. It 
acknowledges that this approach contributes to compliance, as it 
constrains employees to act in accordance with the law and checks 
their misconduct through its monitoring. 
Part II then uses social psychological and organizational research 
to point to several problems with external compliance. One problem 
is that, as noted above, its heavily rule- and procedure-based 
orientation may lead compliance to become a routine, which may 
cause firm employees to act in accordance with the form, not the 
spirit, of the rules and standards. Moreover, although compliance 
with the law has become ingrained in the securities business, the 
external approach inevitably makes brokers think of compliance as 
secondary in importance to business, particularly since a firm must 
leave considerable discretion to its employees in their dealings with 
clients. Thus, in the worst cases, this kind of compliance can be 
ignored or gamed, which, in a perverse way, contributes to illegal 
and unethical practices in these organizations. More significantly, it 
crowds out other approaches to compliance, particularly the internal 
approach, because individuals meeting external compliance 
requirements may feel no need to understand and to be motivated 
by the legal policies and ethical standards underlying the 
requirements. Part II then observes that, although regulators and 
SROs advocate a compliance orientation that encourages conduct in 
accordance with legal policies and professional standards—the 
“culture of compliance”—they constantly reinforce the model of all-
encompassing external control over firm employees. 
Part II next observes that there were many cases of failure of 
compliance in the financial crisis, for illegal and unethical practices 
occurred in firms with robust external compliance. This suggests that 
the external compliance model has serious limitations. Yet reforms 
following the crisis have reinforced the external approach and even 
expanded its mission by adding to the laws and rules it must translate 
into firm procedures, by enhancing regulatory examinations, and by 
extending the external control model to other financial institutions. 
This Part emphasizes how the increase in compliance burdens on 
broker-dealers may undermine the flexibility and capacity for 
innovation that is the hallmark of a beneficial finance. 
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Part III offers a reorientation in the compliance approach: 
compliance must be transformed so as to downplay, but maintain, 
the external perspective and to reemphasize an internal approach that 
promotes the goals, policies, and standards of the federal securities 
laws and the broker-dealer profession in employee decision making. 
The goal of compliance and compliance officers would be to change 
the decision framework of brokers so that they would consider the 
goals, policies, and standards in their business activities. In a word, 
the compliance officer would become an advisor and counselor to 
the firm, reminding brokers and other firm employees of the social 
purposes of their activities. This approach finds support in current 
social psychological and organizational research on ethical and pro-
social decision making.22 Part III reviews ways in which compliance 
officers can promote this internal compliance and also contends that 
this changed emphasis requires the assistance of FINRA and the 
SEC. It recognizes that FINRA and the SEC would resist this 
change, as it differs from their established approach and risks making 
them appear to be soft towards the securities industry. The Part then 
discusses, as a way to overcome their resistance to the reorientation, 
how the success of the internal approach could be assessed and 
measured in a multi-year pilot program. It recommends that FINRA 
propose the reorientation in new supplementary material to an 
existing supervisory rule, which will provide the reorientation with 
express regulatory authority, as well as allow commenters to identify 
potential problems with the approach. The Part concludes by 
discussing ways that FINRA and the SEC could promote internal 
compliance and by making several suggestions about how FINRA 
and the SEC could lessen the enforcement role of compliance, which 
is an impediment to the internal approach. Part IV concludes. 
I. THE FOUNDATIONS AND PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF 
COMPLIANCE 
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Compliance in Broker-
Dealers 
The current state of compliance in broker-dealers is, to a great 
extent, a product of a broker-dealer’s legal responsibility for its 
personnel that is imposed under the Exchange Act and the common 
 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
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law.23 Compliance means that a broker-dealer and its employees must 
conduct their business in accordance with their legal, regulatory, and 
professional obligations, which generally, but not exclusively, arise 
under federal securities laws and regulations and FINRA rules. 
Section 15(b)(4)(D) of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to 
discipline a broker-dealer for, among other things, the willful 
violation of, or the inability to comply with, the federal securities 
laws or their regulations by the broker-dealer itself or by any person 
associated with such broker-dealer.24 This means that if an employee 
of a broker-dealer willfully violates the securities laws or regulations, 
the broker-dealer is subject to SEC discipline under the statutory 
provision, which could include suspension of its registration for up 
to twelve months or even the revocation of its registration, which 
would mean that the broker-dealer could no longer engage in the 
brokerage business. In addition to this statute, the SEC, as enforcer 
of the federal securities laws, also used the common law doctrine of 
respondeat superior to make a firm responsible for the acts of its 
employees engaged in the securities business.25 Accordingly, the 
statute, together with the common law obligation, gives broker-
dealers an incentive to supervise their employees to ensure that they 
comply with applicable laws and regulations. Supervisors and 
employees need to know what compliance with the laws and 
 
 23. The focus here is on the industry-specific origins of compliance within broker-
dealers. These compliance systems have been influenced and shaped by factors leading to 
compliance in business (particularly publicly traded) firms. General business compliance is the 
subject of a rich scholarly literature. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate 
Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958–75 (2009) and accompanying notes (discussing origins 
of corporate compliance and referencing much of the significant contributions to this 
literature); Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization 
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 71, 88–103 (2014). 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (2012). “Associated person” is defined in Section 
3(a)(18) of the Exchange Act to include the following: 
any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such broker or dealer (or any 
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), any person 
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with 
such broker or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer . . .  
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2012). This definition sweeps in all those who engage in the 
securities business in a broker-dealer as well as controlling persons, but excludes clerical and 
ministerial employees. 
 25. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision and Compliance of the 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered 
Representatives and Branch Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1363–64 (1989) (discussing 
the SEC’s initial legal theories for imposing supervisory liability upon broker-dealers). 
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regulations entails so that compliance and the accompanying 
supervision can be properly accomplished. The compliance function 
or department of a broker-dealer accomplishes this task. 
Section 15(b)(4)(D) proved to be an inadequate provision for 
the SEC to enforce legal compliance by broker-dealers and their 
employees. By its terms, the provision allows the SEC to discipline 
only the firm, not the violating employee. Moreover, it does not 
provide for discipline of firm supervisors who fail to prevent the 
violations. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 remedied these 
problems by adding sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6), which made 
supervisory liability explicit in the Exchange Act and which thus gave 
a major impetus to compliance.26 Under section 15(b)(4)(E), a 
broker-dealer is subject to sanctions if, among other things, it or an 
associated person willfully “failed reasonably to supervise, with a 
view to preventing” such violation, another person who committed 
the violation.27 This amendment makes the broker-dealer explicitly 
liable for its own and its associated persons’ failure to supervise. 
Furthermore, section 15(b)(6) provides that an associated person 
who, among other things, commits a supervisory violation is also 
liable and subject to SEC discipline.28 Under this latter provision, the 
SEC can discipline branch managers and other supervisors in a 
broker-dealer for their failure to supervise employees under their 
authority. These statutory additions reinforce the need for a firm 
function (i.e., compliance) that would assist individual supervisors, 
who have personal supervisory liability, in fulfilling their supervisory 
obligations. Moreover, these provisions, which add to the 
enforcement authority of the SEC, have shaped the orientation of 
compliance so that, as discussed below, it becomes a subject of SEC 
and FINRA enforcement. 
Section 15(b)(4)(E) provides both the firm and, through section 
15(b)(6), firm supervisors with defenses to an SEC charge of 
supervisory liability. It states that “no person shall be deemed to 
have failed reasonably to supervise any other person” if, first, there 
were “established procedures[] and a system for applying” them 
“which would reasonably be expected to prevent and to detect, 
 
 26. Pub. L. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 571–72 (1964) (15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5)(E), (b)(7) 
(1964)). These provisions are now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(E), (b)(6). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (2012). This section imposes the supervisory obligation 
through a cross-reference to section 78(b)(4)(E) (2012). 
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insofar as practicable,” any securities law violations by the supervised 
person;29 and, second, if the supervisor has “reasonably discharged” 
her or his duties under the procedures and system “without 
reasonable cause to believe” that these “procedures and system were 
not being complied with.”30 This foregoing language means that, to 
offer the statutory defense, a firm has to have well-drafted 
supervisory procedures for ensuring that the firm and all its 
employees comply with securities laws and regulations as well as a 
system, which implies the resources and responsible people, to 
implement these procedures. Moreover, the firm and its supervisors 
have to demonstrate that they fulfilled their responsibilities under 
these procedures and system and, therefore, that the procedures and 
system were not just “window dressing.”31 
This statutory defense to an SEC charge of failure to supervise is 
clearly a roadmap for the growth of compliance, since there would 
have to be a firm compliance department or group that would be 
responsible for drafting the supervisory procedures and assisting in 
the implementation of the supervisory system. Moreover, compliance 
officers would be critical in ensuring that the last prong of the 
statutory defense is satisfied: that the procedures and the system are 
being followed. They would accomplish this task through their 
monitoring for legal compliance and following up on any problem or 
potential problem (known in the trade as a “red flag”)32 that surfaces 
in a firm, which could suggest a legal violation and thus potentially a 
 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i) (2012). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(ii) (2012). 
 31. See id.; see also RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., STOCKBROKER SUPERVISION: MANAGING 
STOCKBROKERS AND SURVIVING SANCTIONS 15 (1989) (discussing, in general terms, the 
elements of the statutory defense from the SEC’s perspective); John H. Walsh, Right the First 
Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 165, 174–77 (discussing origins of the statutory defense). 
 32. A “red flag” is an unusual event or practice that could be a sign of a securities 
violation and, therefore, one that must be monitored or investigated. See, e.g., FINRA, 
Regulatory Notice 08-18, Unauthorized Proprietary Trading (2008) (identifying “red flags” 
for improper conduct by proprietary traders in firms); In re Gutfreund et al., Exchange Act 
Release No. 31554, 52 SEC Docket 2849, 1992 WL 362753 at *12 (Dec. 3, 1992) (“red 
flags” are “‘suggestions’ of irregularity”). So ingrained is this notion in brokerage culture that 
parties engaging in inappropriate conduct and attempting to avoid detection themselves 
sometimes state that they do not want their conduct to raise any “red flags.” See In re 
Guggenheim Sec., LLC, FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent No. 
20100226640003 6 (Oct. 11, 2012) (traders hiding improper transactions write the following 
email: “‘this is not about the money, but really about not raising any more red flags on a 
settlement that already caused so much trouble for everyone.’”). 
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supervisory one. In sum, a firm has to have a compliance department, 
or at least a compliance officer, devoted to creating a well-functioning 
supervisory system to take advantage of the statutory defense, which is 
critical since, under sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6), the firm and 
its supervisors face explicit supervisory liability. 
The SEC has in fact used its interpretation of a firm’s supervisory 
obligations under section 15(b)(4)(E), as well as of the statutory 
defense, to push for the development of compliance, often through 
opinions issued in administrative proceedings against broker-
dealers.33 In certain significant cases, it found that securities law 
violations occurring in a broker-dealer indicated that the firm and its 
supervisors had failed in their supervisory duties by not having an 
adequate compliance function.34 As a result of the proceedings, the 
SEC required a prosecuted firm to expand its compliance 
department, and this outcome became in turn a model for other 
firms. In this vein, a major SEC goal has been to require that a 
broker-dealer have a compliance department and adequate staff 
whose size would be proportional to the size of the firm and the 
growth and complexity of the firm’s activities.35 In this way, 
compliance officers would be able to oversee each part of the firm’s 
business. Moreover, the SEC demands that compliance officers have 
autonomy within the firm; officers would have their own reporting 
structure and lines of authority apart from those of the firm’s 
business. They also need the power to report their concerns about 
problems in transactions and new business development to senior 
 
 33. The SEC can bring actions against regulated firms, such as broker-dealers, in its own 
administrative proceedings before administrative law judges, whose decisions the SEC itself can 
review. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012). On the rules governing the proceedings, see 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 201.200–490 (2013). 
 34. See, e.g., In re Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22755, 1986 
WL 626342 (Jan. 2, 1986) (discussing problems with respect to the powers of the compliance 
department). The SEC might especially make this point if the firm had expanded its product 
offerings or entered into new business lines without similarly expanding compliance. See, e.g., 
In re Prudential Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 33082, 1993 WL 430273 (Oct. 21, 
1993) (in this case, the broker-dealer entered into the sale of limited partnership interests, 
which activity was not adequately supervised). For a recent example, see In re TD Ameritrade, 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 63829 (Feb. 3, 2011), available at http:/www.sec.gov 
(discussing supervisory and compliance failures in the firm’s marketing of a new fund that was 
misrepresented in the sales process as a money market fund). 
 35. For example, in the Prudential administrative proceedings, the SEC insisted that this 
broker-dealer have regional compliance directors, who would report to the chief compliance 
officer, in specific regions where Prudential had branches. See Exchange Act Release No. 
33082, supra note 34, at *27. 
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firm decision makers and to have firm supervisors explicitly address 
these concerns.36 
 
 36. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22755, supra note 34 
(faulting firm for failing to follow directions of compliance as to dismissal of rogue brokers). 
See also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 31, at 19–27 (citing SEC decisions on this subject). These 
SEC administrative decisions also raise an important issue about the relationship between 
supervision and compliance that has not been definitively resolved. Supervision refers to the 
power of one person over another in a firm’s chain of command, which includes, as discussed 
above, the obligation to ensure that the supervised employee complies with securities laws and 
regulations. It is often typified by the power of the supervisor to control the actions of, and 
ultimately to dismiss, an employee. See In re Huff, Exchange Act Release No. 29017, 1991 
WL 296561, at *9 (Mar. 28, 1991). In a seminal SEC decision on this subject, Gutfreund et 
al., supra note 32, the SEC made the following observation in the context of discussing the 
supervisory responsibilities of legal and compliance officers, which offers a broader view than 
the control standard: 
Employees of brokerage firms who have legal or compliance responsibilities do not 
become “supervisors” for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6) solely 
because they occupy those positions. Rather, determining if a particular person is a 
“supervisor” depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case, that person has a requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect 
the conduct of the employee whose behavior is at issue. 
Id. at *15 (emphasis added). Compliance in a broker-dealer is not, without more, part of the 
supervisory structure and a compliance officer is not a supervisor, again without more facts, 
such as that a compliance officer has additional, business line responsibilities. Rather, as 
explained above, compliance makes effective supervision possible. Compliance officers are not 
themselves supervisors because they do not hire and fire employees nor do they tell others 
what to do or make disciplinary decisions when a violation is found—those actions are for the 
supervisors. However, the SEC has held that, once a compliance or legal officer has a sufficient 
position of influence within a firm, he or she may have the responsibility, with other 
supervisors, for taking appropriate action in response to misconduct. This action could include, 
in extreme circumstances such as when the main supervisors do not adequately respond to the 
misconduct, escalating the matter to the board of directors, resigning or reporting the problem 
to regulatory authorities. See id. at *16.  
This issue has recently come to the foreground mainly because of a case involving a 
disciplinary action against a general counsel who was also the CCO of a broker-dealer. See In re 
Urban, SEC Initial Decision Release No. 402 (Sept. 8, 2010). In that case, Urban attempted 
to take action against a rogue broker, who engaged in numerous legal violations, including 
unauthorized trading in client accounts and doing trades for a stock manipulator. Urban urged 
that the broker be dismissed, but he was overruled by the head of retail sales who agreed to 
supervise the broker personally. The broker ultimately left the firm in the wake of numerous 
customer problems that resulted in a significant financial loss to the broker-dealer. Urban was 
charged with a supervisory violation. The SEC took a position on supervision that was broader 
than the two traditional theories of “control” and “affect,” since it would find supervisory 
liability when a person, such as a compliance officer, has “authority” in the firm, i.e., is listened 
to. See id. at 46. The administrative law judge ruled that Urban was in fact a supervisor, but 
that he had fulfilled his supervisory responsibilities. At the urging of its Enforcement Division, 
the SEC declined to affirm summarily the judge’s ruling, stating, among other things, that it 
needed to consider whether it was enough for Urban to report problems to the supervisor of 
the broker or whether he should have escalated the matter to the firm’s chief executive officer 
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Similarly, SRO supervisory requirements significantly spur the 
growth of compliance in firms. The Exchange Act requires SROs to 
enforce compliance with federal securities laws and regulations, as 
well as compliance with their own rules, by their members and to 
have rules designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices, [and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.”37 
To achieve these purposes, the NYSE and the NASD (FINRA’s 
predecessor), as well as other SROs, historically required their 
members to have a supervisory system in place to ensure that their 
associated persons were properly supervised so as to comply with the 
law and rules.38 
Over the years, the SRO requirements for supervisory systems 
have become extremely detailed and specify how a broker-dealer is to 
conduct supervision, as opposed to providing a defense to 
supervisory liability, as is the case with section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 
Exchange Act. FINRA requires each of its members to have “a 
system to supervise the activities of each registered representative, 
registered principal,39 and other associated person that is reasonably 
 
and its board of directors. See In re Urban, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13655 (Dec. 7, 
2010). Eventually, the SEC dismissed the proceedings because, with three members recusing 
themselves, the other two split on the decision. See id. The case raised concern among 
practitioners that compliance officers were being inappropriately pulled into the supervisory 
structure of a firm. See, e.g., David C. Prince, NSCP Files Amicus Brief with SEC in Theodore W. 
Urban Case, NSCP CURRENTS 1 (Nov./Dec. 2010) (discussing position of the National 
Society of Compliance Professionals on this case). The SEC staff recently asserted that the 
administrative law judge’s decision is “of no effect,” in light of the dismissal of the action. See 
SEC Division of Trading & Markets, Frequently Asked Questions about Liability of 
Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker-Dealers under Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of 
the Exchange Act 4 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at http:www.sec.gov divisions/ marketreg/faq-
cco-supervision-093013.htm. 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(2), (6) (2012) (for securities associations); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78f(b)(1), (5) (2012) (for exchanges). The SEC reviews the rules in connection with the 
registration of an association or an exchange, as well as ongoing proposed rule changes or ones 
initiated by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)–(c). 
 38. The then NASD required in Article III section 27 of its Rules of Fair Practice that 
its members have written supervisory procedures to ensure the supervision of each associated 
person. In 1989, the Section was expanded to include assignment of each associated person to 
the supervision of a principal, an annual compliance review, and special characterization of 
certain offices (Offices of Supervisory Jurisdiction or “OSJs”) where major client activities are 
conducted. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision and Compliance, supra note 
25, at 1389–94 (for a summary of these rules). 
 39. “Principals” are associated persons “who are actively engaged in the management of 
the member’s investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation, 
conduct of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these 
functions are designated as principals.” See FINRA, Registration of Principals-1021, NASD 
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designed to achieve compliance” with securities laws and regulations 
and FINRA rules.40 Among other things, the system requires a 
broker-dealer to have written procedures for the supervision (written 
supervisory procedures or “WSPs”) of each of its securities 
businesses and associated persons, to designate supervisors for each 
regulated business, to have annual compliance reviews for each 
registered representative and principal, to have internal inspections of 
all offices, to have a principal review the transactions and 
correspondence with the public of registered representatives relating 
to their securities business, and to investigate the character and 
qualifications of any associated person.41 In other words, while the 
duty of supervision under the Exchange Act is general, as one would 
expect in the foundational statute, the FINRA supervisory 
requirements are both general and detailed. Compliance officers are 
needed to help the firm and its supervisors administer the required 
supervisory system. 
Moreover, since FINRA rules govern each securities business 
activity and generally dictate how it is to be conducted in accordance 
with the applicable law and regulation, nearly every FINRA rule has 
supervisory and, therefore, compliance implications.42 Each year 
 
RULES, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4254 
&element_id=3579&highlight=registration#r4254 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (Rule 1021(b)). 
As a result of the consolidation of the NASD and the regulatory arm of the NYSE, a new FINRA 
rulebook, combining the rules of each of these SROs, is being prepared and implemented. 
Therefore, current FINRA rules include some NASD rules, some NYSE rules (which apply only 
to broker-dealers formerly regulated by the NYSE), and the new FINRA rules. 
 40. See FINRA, Supervision-3010, NASD RULES, http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3717 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) 
(Rule 3010(a)). FINRA proposed to create a new FINRA Rule 3110 to replace NASD Rule 
3010 (as well as a new FINRA Rule 3120 to replace NASD Rule 3012 discussed below). See 
Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Rules Regarding Supervision in the 
Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 69902, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,792 (July 
8, 2013). After amending its proposal in response to industry and other comments, FINRA 
received the SEC’s approval on its new rules. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.; Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change To 
Adopt Rules Regarding Supervision in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 1, Exchange Act Release No. 71,179, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,542 (Dec. 30, 2013). 
FINRA has determined that this rule change will take effect on December 1, 2014. See 
FINRA, Consolidated Supervision Rules, Regulatory Notice 14-10 (Mar. 2014). Since the 
new supervisory rules maintain the general content and overall orientation of the current rules, 
which are discussed below, the Article will focus on the FINRA rules currently in force. 
 41. See FINRA, supra note 40, at §§ 3010(a)–(e). 
 42. A good example is FINRA’s recently promulgated suitability rule, FINRA Rule 
2111. See FINRA, Know your Customer and Suitability, REG. NOTICE NO. 11-02 (Jan. 2011) 
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there are new FINRA rules or the existing rules are modified in 
response to the development of new businesses and products in 
broker-dealers or to the imposition of new legal obligations imposed 
upon these firms. These changes reinforce the need for a broker-
dealer to have a compliance division or group that can keep track of 
all of the legal and regulatory duties of the firm and associated 
persons and that can help the firm’s employees satisfy their 
obligations, and the firm’s supervisors their supervisory duties 
through guidance, monitoring, and follow-up. 
Specific SRO supervisory rules promulgated in reaction to 
scandals in the brokerage industry gave an additional impetus to the 
growth of compliance. In 2004, the SROs issued two compliance-
related rules after a notable failure of supervision in several broker-
dealers where, undetected, a single broker misappropriated over 
$100 million in customer money over fifteen years.43 One of these 
rules was (to use the FINRA example) NASD Rule 3012, which 
requires that a firm have one or more principals who establish 
supervisory controls to test its supervisory system on a yearly basis in 
order to assess its compliance effectiveness and identify the need for 
additional WSPs.44 Under the Rule, the responsible principal or 
principals establish the controls, conduct the testing, create 
additional WSPs to respond to weaknesses revealed by the testing, 
and annually report to a broker-dealer’s senior management about 
 
(announcing SEC approval of the new rule and discussing it and its difference with the earlier 
NASD version). Suitability is essentially a duty imposed on a broker when he or she 
recommends an investment product or (under the new rule) an investment strategy to a 
customer. Under the rule, a broker must understand what he or she is recommending (known 
as “reasonable-basis suitability”) and make a determination that the product or strategy is 
suitable for a particular client (“customer-specific suitability”). See id. at 2111.05. Compliance 
of course must lay out the steps for a broker as to how he or she satisfies the suitability 
requirement and how a supervisor reviews a broker’s transactions to see that he or she in fact 
fulfilled these requirements for a given recommendation. 
 43. See Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Self-regulatory Organizations; Order 
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments No. 1 and 2 by National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Internal Controls and Supervisory Control Amendments 
and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerating Approval of Amendment No. 3, 
Exchange Act Release No. 49,883, 83 S.E.C. Docket 192, 2004 WL 1574002, at 1* (June 
17, 2004) (recounting the case of Gruttadauria, the rogue broker). 
 44. See FINRA, Supervisory Control System-3012, NASD RULES, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3722 
(NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)). FINRA is replacing NASD Rule 3012 by FINRA Rule 3120; see 
also supra note 39. 
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their findings.45 This kind of supervisory control system and related 
testing procedure increased the demand for compliance specialists 
who understood supervisory and compliance systems, weaknesses in 
those systems, and industry developments with respect to their 
improvement. Even more specifically promoting compliance was the 
second rule, FINRA Rule 3130 (formerly NASD Rule 3013), which 
requires a firm to appoint at least one chief compliance officer 
(“CCO”).46 Under this Rule, a firm’s chief executive officer 
(“CEO”) must certify annually that there are “in place processes to 
establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance 
policies and written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with” SRO rules and federal securities laws and 
regulations. The CEO must also certify that he or she has had “one 
or more meetings” with the CCO in the preceding 12 months to 
discuss the processes.47 This rule is both a regulatory 
acknowledgment of the importance of compliance and an effort to 
increase its visibility and authority in broker-dealers. 
The Exchange Act requirements and SRO rules thus ensure that 
compliance has become a specialized occupation within financial 
firms. Compliance duties initially were often done by firm 
supervisors with the help of in-house lawyers and outside counsel.48 
However, not surprisingly, compliance became an increasingly 
specialized occupation, particularly in larger firms, as the SEC and 
the SROs pushed them to have a compliance function that reflected 
their size and activities. The increase in and complexity of financial 
activities done by larger firms and the accompanying growth in laws 
 
 45. See NASD Rule 3012(a)(1), supra note 44. 
 46. See FINRA, Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes-3130, 
FINRA RULES, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403 
&element_id=6286 (FINRA Rule 3130(a)). See also NASD, Annual Compliance Certification 
and Designation of Chief Compliance Officer, Notice to Members 04-79, 2004 WL 2587763, 
at *1 (Nov. 1, 2004) (“NASD Rule 3013 is intended to bolster attention to members’ 
compliance programs by requiring substantial and purposeful interaction between business and 
compliance officers throughout the firm.”). 
 47. See FINRA Rule 3130(b), supra note 46. The Rule provides a “model” certification 
for the CEO. See id. at Rule 3130(c). 
 48. See generally SECS. INDUS. ASS’N: COMPLIANCE & LEGAL DIV., WHITE PAPER ON 
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 1 (Oct. 2005). This compliance model, in fact, is still found in 
small broker-dealers, which operate with fewer resources than do large firms and where, for 
cost reasons, firm supervisors and other employees often wear multiple hats, including that of 
the CCO. See id., at 2–3 (discussing different compliance needs and structure of small firms). 
Smaller firms may also “outsource” some of their compliance tasks, but every firm must have a 
chief compliance officer who is responsible for compliance. 
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and regulations relating to them meant that firm supervisors could 
no longer stay current with all of the legal, regulatory, and SRO 
responsibilities of their firm and associated persons.49 They thus had 
to create and then rely upon a specialized group within the firm, the 
compliance department, whose officers could devote their time and 
efforts to producing and updating supervisory and compliance 
procedures as well as ensure that their firm and its employees 
operated in accordance with the law and regulation and that their 
firm’s supervisors satisfied their supervisory obligations. This meant 
that, as mentioned above and discussed further below, compliance 
officers would produce and implement the WSPs dictating how an 
activity should be conducted and supervised and would then 
monitor the firm to see that the WSPs were followed. 
Because FINRA rules mandate that every firm must have a CCO, 
the number of brokerage employees now engaged primarily in 
compliance is, at a minimum, equal to the number of firms.50 Larger 
 
 49. See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
COMPLIANCE, at 18 (Mar. 2013) (discussing the various compliance models). An early writer 
on broker-dealer compliance observed that it took shape as a specialized activity in the early 
1960s. See O. Ray Vass, The Compliance Officer in Today’s Regulatory Environment, in 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 3 (PLI Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Ser. No. B4-6806 3). 
 50. There is different data on the number of broker-dealers. According to FINRA 
statistics, which are the most recent, as of July 2014, there are 4137 member firms with 
162,634 branch offices and 634,506 registered representatives. See FINRA STATISTICS & 
DATA, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). As of the end 
of 2012, the SEC put the number of broker-dealers at 4761. See SELECT SEC AND MARKET 
DATA FISCAL 2013, at 21. As of the end of 2011, SIFMA put the number at 4527. See SEC. 
INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2012 FACT BOOK 25 (2012). The firms fall into four rough 
categories: (i) the approximately 200 large firms, which historically were members of the New 
York Stock Exchange, which have most of the customer assets and most of the industry’s 
revenue and which are often in large financial groups; see id. at 28–34 (reporting data on 
former NYSE firms), (ii) mid-sized, full-line firms, which are generally regional; (iii) discount 
brokerage firms; and (iv) smaller firms, sometimes operating with only few brokers or 
“registered representatives.” See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, FACT BOOK 2009, at 43 
(2009) (discussing the kinds of broker-dealers). More recent data on firm size is not readily 
available. SIFMA also provides a “heat map” of the location of broker-dealers in the United 
States, which shows that they are concentrated in urban areas, with a significant percentage in 
the New York City area. See SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, BrokerDealer Heatmap, 
Table 1.1 (updated as of Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.sifma.org/research 
/statistics.aspx. Approximately a third of employees in the securities industry works in the tri-
state area of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. See U.S. Industry Employment, SEC. 
INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N (as of Sept. 5, 2014), available at http://www.sifma.org/ 
research/statistics.aspx. Like all financial firms, broker-dealers have consolidated in the past 
years, most recently due to the upheaval occasioned by the financial crisis. The number of 
broker-dealers has been gradually declining since the middle of the 1990s. See SIFMA, 
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firms are likely to have more compliance officers because their 
businesses are diverse and complex and because they thus need a 
more developed compliance function.51 Compliance officers work in 
all kinds of structures, depending upon the size and businesses of a 
firm.52 In large broker-dealers, compliance officers would generally 
be in a separate department or division under the CCO and thus in a 
separate reporting line. They might all be grouped in one central 
location or work in the business groups or branch offices that they 
advise and monitor.53 In other words, like employees in other 
control functions, such as internal auditors, compliance officers have 
their own reporting structure, even if they work closely with business 
groups when developing compliance procedures for business 
activities. As a result of this distinction from business and of their 
control function, the compensation for full-time compliance officers, 
unlike that for most brokers and bankers, is not based on their 
business productivity and only indirectly determined upon the 
profitability of their branch or business line.54  
 
Heatmap, Table Broker-Dealer Creation and Termination By Year. For example, from 2008 to 
July 2014, the number has declined from 4895 to 4137. See FINRA STATISTICS, 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/. The consolidation is due to numerous causes, 
including the search for economies of scale, which has affected the entire financial industry, 
and technological innovations, which allow investors to trade themselves without the aid of a 
broker. See generally 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION 1-10 to 1-26, 1-39 to 1-43 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (discussing the 
reasons for the industry’s transformation). 
 51. For a description of compliance at Goldman Sachs, see http://www.goldman
sachs.com/careers/why-goldman-sachs/our-divisions/global-compliance/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2014). Admittedly, many of those who have the position of compliance officer 
or CCO in smaller firms have other jobs and do not devote themselves fulltime to compliance. 
See NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 5 (2011) (reporting 
that even CCOs in major firms spend only half of their time on compliance). 
 52. See generally SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 17–18 
(discussing the various compliance structures used). 
 53. See id. If they do so, they should not be under the authority of a branch manager or 
of a principal in charge of a business line, but should be reporting to the CCO. See id. at 4. 
 54. See generally INST. FOR INT’L FIN. & OLIVER WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM IN 
WHOLESALE BANKING 2011: ASSESSING THREE YEARS OF PROGRESS 11–12 (Oct. 2011) 
(describing survey results of compensation practices in large financial firms for compliance and 
other control functions). The author was on the working group assisting in the preparation of 
this report. There is not extensive information available about compliance compensation. See 
generally NAT’L REGULATORY SERV., supra note 51, at 5 (providing general survey data on 
compliance compensation); SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, 2012 CROSS 
INDUSTRY CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS SALARY SURVEY 19 (2012) (indicating average 
compensation for CCOs in financial services to be approximately $165,000); see also BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL 
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As compliance has become a specialized role, it has taken on the 
expected features of a professional undertaking, which reinforces its 
specialization.55 Traditionally, individuals learned compliance “on the 
job.” Although this still occurs, there are now programs where a 
compliance officer can obtain specialized training in compliance and 
be “certified.”56 Indeed, law schools are beginning to train students 
for compliance positions as a result of their perception that 
opportunities exist for students to become compliance officers in this 
difficult employment environment.57 There are, moreover, 
compliance consultants often drawn from the ranks of former 
regulators who train compliance officers who, in turn, provide on-
the-job advice about how to best perform their work and who even 
do certain compliance duties for a firm when they can be 
outsourced.58 Additionally, societies of compliance professionals 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES MAY 2013, 13-1041 COMPLIANCE OFFICERS (reporting the mean 
annual wage of compliance officers in other financial services as $90,800), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes131041.htm. Other data shows that it is less than 
compensation for bankers and brokers, but that the gap has diminished as compensation for 
compliance officers has increased. See INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & OLIVER 
WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM IN WHOLESALE BANKING 2010: PROGRESS IN 
IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL STANDARDS 22–23 (Sept. 2010) (discussing the narrowing gap 
between compensation of business employees and those in control functions). Most recently, it 
has stabilized, which means that, in the ongoing financial downturn, firms are demanding that 
compliance officers do more tasks. See NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 51, at 2 (noting 
that compensation for compliance professionals has stagnated since 2008, despite new 
regulatory demands). 
 55. There is a rich literature on the transformation of activities into “professions.” See, 
e.g., MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1977). 
 56. One example is the annual FINRA Institute at Wharton, which trains and certifies 
compliance professionals in the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (“CRCP”) 
Program. See Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional Program, FINRA.ORG, 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Education/UniversityPrograms/FINRAInstitute (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2014). The author of this Article has been a regular faculty member in this program, 
teaching, among other things, the subjects of supervision and suitability. The National Society 
of Compliance Professionals also operates a certification program, the Certified Securities 
Compliance Professional Program. See Certified Securities Compliance Professional, CSCP.ORG, 
http://www.cscp.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2014). 
 57. The Regulatory Compliance Association offers online education in asset 
management compliance in conjunction with law schools. See Overview of Law & Masters 
Concentration, https://www.rcaonline.org/law-masters-degree/law-students (last visited Sept. 
22, 2014). 
 58. There are large numbers of these consultant groups. Representative of them are 
Ascendant Compliance Management, ASCENDANT COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.ascendantcompliance.com, (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), and Frontline 
Compliance, LLC, FRONTLINE COMPLIANCE, http://www.frontlinecompliance.com, (last 
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provide resources and discuss new issues and challenges.59 
Professional journals are also devoted to this activity.60 Regulators 
have encouraged this professionalization of compliance.61 Therefore, 
compliance officers can justly feel that the importance of their task 
has been recognized by senior management in their firms and by 
regulators, and that they have “arrived.” 
B. The Basic Tasks of Compliance Officers 
As discussed above, compliance is closely associated with, and 
essentially makes possible, broker-dealer supervision because the 
purpose of supervision is to ensure that a firm and its employees 
comply with the federal securities laws and regulations, other 
applicable laws, SRO rules, and industry standards. Compliance 
officers perform this basic compliance function by providing advice 
on a daily basis as to compliance requirements for individual business 
activities.62 To accomplish this task, compliance officers must have a 
good understanding of WSPs and be familiar enough with business 
employees’ activities to produce and update WSPs according to 
FINRA mandates.63 The WSPs dictate how employees should 
conduct a particular business activity so as to comply with laws and 
regulations and how the activity should be supervised and 
monitored. The WSPs thus specify, in a step-by-step way, how a 
broker conducts an activity, how recording or reporting relating to 
the activity is done, how the designated supervisor oversees the 
broker engaged in the activity, how additional monitoring occurs by 
compliance staff, often through the review of transaction records, 
how problems might emerge and what the broker, supervisor,  
 
 
visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 59. Again, the best-known in this respect is the National Society of Compliance 
Professionals, http://www.nscp.org/site_home.cfm. 
 60. One example is Practical Compliance and Risk Management for the Securities Industry, 
a journal that is published by Wolters Kluwer. The author is co–editor-in-chief of this journal. 
 61. For example, in conjunction with FINRA, the SEC holds compliance outreach 
meetings where commissioners and staff meet with compliance officers and other control 
professionals of broker-dealers. See 2014 Regional Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-
Dealers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/complianceoutreach-
bd.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).  
 62. See SIFMA, White Paper, supra note 49, at 3. See also Vass, supra note 49, at 5 
(referring to compliance, not pejoratively, as a “dumping ground”). 
 63. See SIFMA, White Paper, supra note 49, at 4. 
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compliance officer, and/or another person should do in response to 
those problems.64 
Producing, revising and implementing the WSPs are never-
ending tasks for compliance officers. Since the WSPs must cover 
every securities activity in the firm in the extensive way suggested 
above, and since firms often engage in new business lines and 
produce and/or sell new products, compliance officers must 
constantly create new WSPs. They must also refine existing WSPs in 
response to problems or gaps revealed by the firm’s experience, by 
the testing mandated by NASD Rule 3012, or as a result of issues in 
WSPs raised by FINRA or regulators in an examination of a firm or 
because of industry-wide matters.65 Implementation means that a 
 
 64. Take, for example, a broker recommending an investment to a client, which raises, 
among other things, “suitability” issues (i.e., the broker’s duty) when recommending an 
investment or a strategy to a client to ensure that it is appropriate or “suitable” for the client. 
See supra note 42. The WSPs would specify what the basic suitability obligation of a broker is 
with reference to the law and to FINRA rules, explain how a broker satisfies this obligation 
(i.e., learns about the product and gathers the appropriate information about the client to 
determine whether the product is suitable for him or her), and direct the broker to record any 
resulting transaction as a recommended transaction as well as the information reflecting that he 
or she satisfied the suitability obligation. In addition, the WSPs should explain how a broker’s 
supervisor reviews the transaction so as to ensure that the broker met his or her suitability 
obligation. Moreover, the WSPs should set forth additional monitoring by compliance officers 
and the procedures for brokers, supervisors, and compliance officers to follow if a client 
complains about a transaction or if any other “red flag” about lack of appropriateness of the 
product for the client appears. FINRA gives guidance on how a firm should design its 
compliance procedures with respect to the suitability obligation. See FINRA, Suitability: 
Guidance on FINRA’s Suitability Rule, REG. NOTICE NO. 12-55 4–5 (Dec. 2012) (making 
recommendations as to supervision with respect to suitability when a broker recommends both 
an investment product and a non-investment one); FINRA, Know Your Customer and 
Suitability, supra note 42 (discussing a firm’s policies on documenting its compliance with the 
suitability rule). 
 65. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4. 
Compliance might conduct the testing of the system together with the internal audit function, 
which is designed to test a firm’s internal control procedures. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of 
Compliance, supra note 49, at 9. In a related context, compliance might also engage in some 
aspects of a firm’s risk management, particularly by assessing its regulatory and reputational 
risks. See id. at 20. To take a recent example again from the suitability context, the financial crisis 
revealed many problems in the sale of structured products to retail customers, such as brokers’ 
lack of understanding about them and the unsuitable nature of them for many investors—which 
are both suitability issues. Thus, compliance officers of broker-dealers that sold these products 
had to revise the WSPs regarding the sale of such products to address these problems (e.g., by 
enhancing the suitability analysis and supervisor oversight when they were sold). See generally 
SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, STAFF SUMMARY REPORT ON 
ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN EXAMINATIONS OF CERTAIN STRUCTURED SECURITIES PRODUCTS SOLD 
TO RETAIL INVESTORS 7 (July 27, 2011) (discussing suitability issues in connection with the 
selling of these products, which were revealed through SEC examinations). 
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compliance officer ensures that employees are following the WSPs. 
This task includes the distribution of the WSPs as well as any 
supplementary documentation, such as required reports or forms 
mandated by the WSPs, throughout the firm to its departments and 
branches and the training of brokers and supervisors in the WSPs.66 
Compliance officers then check on whether in fact the procedures 
are being followed, often through the production and review of 
reports on transactions.67 Today, compliance monitoring is aided by 
technology, which has greatly automated the reporting and review 
process.68 
Compliance officers identify and then follow up on compliance 
problems or “red flags.” Compliance officers are thus responsible, 
through their surveillance, for finding out that the WSPs are not 
being followed, which may be due to anything from an innocent 
mistake to fraud.69 They often identify problems because, as noted 
above, they review transaction records and communications and 
through this review, they signal matters warranting further 
 
 66. See SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4. 
 67. See id. at 4–5. This is often referred to as compliance’s “control,” as opposed to its 
“advisory” function. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 4. The 
classic compliance monitoring report is the “exception” report, which lists transactions that are 
outside certain parameters specified by the WSPs or that are otherwise flagged as suspicious, 
such as excessive trading or inappropriate concentration of certain products in accounts. 
 68. For an excellent discussion of problems inherent in the use of technology in 
compliance, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a 
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010). Among these problems, Professor Bamberger 
identifies values that may be embedded in the technology, but that may be at odds with 
regulatory policies. 
To stay with the suitability example, a compliance officer would check that a broker who 
recommended a product to a customer, who then purchased it, had indeed gathered and 
consulted the appropriate information about the customer (or reviewed the information on file 
about him or her) in accordance with the WSPs, and that the broker had received appropriate 
training in the product. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 24 
(discussing monitoring required by the new suitability rule). 
 69. See SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5; 
SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 26 (discussing internal 
investigations). Compliance officers may indicate, for example, that there are problems with a 
newly opened account, such as a wrong address or missing information, which could be due to 
an oversight of a broker or outright fraud. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 
FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent No. 2008013231502 (Aug. 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/DisciplinaryActions/FDAS 
(describing how a registered sales assistant in a branch office set up phony accounts and used 
them to siphon off customer funds; the scheme was not discovered even though the 
compliance department at the main office identified that the accounts often had phony 
addresses and used names of persons who were deceased). 
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investigation. Compliance officers also detect problems through the 
routine internal inspections of offices and branches that are part of 
the supervisory system.70 In these inspections, officers check on 
compliance with regulations by personnel in the office or branch.71 
Moreover, compliance officers are often the firm personnel who 
assist FINRA, the SEC, and other regulators in regulatory 
examinations of their firms and, as a result, they may discover 
problems, or at least regulatory concerns, through their interaction 
with the examiners.72 
This role of identifying potential violations of the federal 
securities laws, FINRA, and firm rules raises the issue of the 
responsibilities of the compliance officer within the firm and as part 
of the regulatory system. As explained above, the compliance officer 
is generally outside the supervisory structure of the firm.73 If a 
compliance officer detects a problem, he or she should alert the 
supervisor who has authority over the broker or banker in question 
so that the supervisor can take the appropriate disciplinary action or 
report the problem up the chain of command in the firm, which 
could involve a report to FINRA or the SEC. Yet, FINRA and SEC 
officials often appear to expect compliance officers to be their “eyes 
and ears” in the firm and to be responsible for reporting to them 
potential legal and regulatory violations.74 Compliance officers have 
to walk a tightrope here, which means doing their job of 
monitoring, following up on problems, and ensuring that 
appropriate supervisors are notified and are taking action (often  
 
 
 
 70. See FINRA, supra note 40, at NASD Rule 3010(c). See also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON 
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, 
supra note 49, at 24–25. 
 71. Both the SEC and FINRA emphasize the importance of internal inspections, 
particularly of branch offices. See SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & 
EXAMINATIONS, IN COOPERATION WITH FINRA, NATIONAL EXAMINATION RISK ALERT: 
BROKER-DEALER BRANCH INSPECTIONS, Vol. I, Issue 2 (Nov. 30, 2011) (providing guidance 
and best practices on how an internal inspection should be conducted). 
 72. See also SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 6; 
SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 26. A broker-dealer is subject to 
examination both by the SEC and FINRA, on a regular basis, as well as “for cause” (i.e., as a 
result of a complaint) or because of an overall investigation into brokerage practices. For a 
general discussion of this subject, see 1 POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 7-52 to 7-71. 
 73. See supra note 36. 
 74. See id. 
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action suggested by compliance), while not taking part in the 
disciplinary and supervisory decisions.75 
Furthermore, compliance officers are educators within the 
broker-dealer. Part of the supervisory obligation of broker-dealers 
involves ensuring that the brokers meet their continuing education 
obligation.76 In addition, every broker must certify annually that he 
or she is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.77 
Compliance officers are generally responsible for this certification (or 
for monitoring the technology permitting it), and they provide or 
arrange for the provision of the necessary continuing education.78 
Because compliance officers monitor legal and regulatory 
developments for WSP purposes, they are able to provide brokers 
with legal and regulatory updates. They are also likely to be involved 
in workforce training when new products or new business lines are 
being introduced, thus requiring education for brokers about how to 
sell the products or to do the new business in compliance with the 
law.79 Education has become a major task of compliance officers. In a 
related vein, compliance officers promote the “culture” of 
compliance in the firm by conducting training in professional and 
ethical standards as well as by producing and administering a code of 
ethical conduct for the firm.80 
In sum, the overall picture of a compliance officer that emerges 
from the above review is that of a position that is intertwined with 
 
 75. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 10–13 
(discussing the issue of the separation of compliance from supervision and recommending that 
the distinction be maintained, unless specific circumstances suggest that a compliance officer 
has actual authority over a matter). 
 76. For a discussion of the continuing education obligations of broker-dealers and their 
registered representatives, see generally 1 POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 6-56.10 to 6-
56.12. These requirements are set out in FINRA Rule 1250. Generally, a broker must fulfill a 
continuing education requirement every three years. 
 77. See supra note 40, at NASD Rule 3010(a)(7). 
 78. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 4. 
 79. See id. at 7. 
 80. See id.; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 27–28. In 
addition, compliance officers have many specialized functions as well: among other things, they 
oversee the screening process and background checks for employees as well as their licensing 
and qualifications; they establish and oversee anti-money laundering and Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act programs; they establish control programs for the safeguarding of customer 
nonpublic personal information; and they oversee procedures designed to prevent insider 
trading and other conflicts of interest. See generally SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF 
COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 5–6; SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, 
at 24–26. These functions are too numerous to discuss here. 
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every securities business of the firm and with each employee. As a 
central task, compliance officers must establish, test, and revise WSPs 
as well as educate brokers concerning them, monitor compliance 
with them, and identify and report on WSP problems. The role of 
compliance has grown in broker-dealers as the number of WSPs has 
expanded. Yet compliance officers do so much more, from advising 
on compliance involving daily business matters and educating 
brokers to maintaining regular contact with regulators. Compliance 
is now well established in broker-dealers and the status of compliance 
officers in both firms and among regulators is growing. However, 
this positive picture obscures several fundamental problems with the 
current orientation of compliance, so it is appropriate to turn a 
critical eye to it. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT ORIENTATION OF 
COMPLIANCE 
A. The Origin, Purpose, and Consequences of External Compliance 
In one of his most well-known books, Discipline and Punish, the 
French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault used the model of 
the prison as a symbol for the new kind of punishment that emerged 
out of the Enlightenment.81 He employed the vivid image of the 
“panopticon,” which was a prison construction, often with prison 
cells arranged in a circle around a central monitoring tower, where 
each prisoner could be viewed at all times.82 
Foucault discussed how reformers of this period believed that 
prisoners could be controlled and, in some cases, rehabilitated 
through a discipline that contrasted with the brutal medieval 
punishment that was used to display publicly the power of the 
sovereign. Foucault showed how this new discipline was applied to 
the minute details of conduct so as to dictate every movement of the 
prisoner and how he or she would be watched to ensure conformity 
with the discipline. This process was designed to transform both the 
body and even the mind of the prisoner so that he or she would be 
literally “re-formed” to become a productive person who could 
return to society.83  
 
 81. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON 80 
(1975). 
 82. See id. at 201–13. 
 83. See id. at 126–32. 
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Foucault explained that, through his discussion of the discipline 
in the prison, he was identifying a kind of social control or power 
that was based upon the Enlightenment’s faith in reason’s ability to 
remake individuals and society: this was the “soft” power of physical 
and mental control that reformers, in the exercise of their reason 
with social goals, would exert over those in need of direction.84 As 
he explained, the use of this power migrated out of the prison into 
other social activities when its proponents realized its value.85 
Foucault highlighted the example of the assembly line and other 
“mechanized labor” in a factory, where managerial scientists 
calculated and shaped the motions of employees to make them as 
productive as possible.86 The use of the new discipline also 
transformed education when educational reformers employed it to 
train and to form children and young adults, both physically and 
mentally, for the labor that was needed in society.87 
With the risk of making a too vivid analogy, broker-dealer 
compliance appears to be an activity that reflects Foucault’s analysis 
of the new form of disciplinary control. This is, in fact, not 
surprising, since in his view the new techniques of control were 
employed in major productive social activities. Typical brokers, like 
Foucault’s prisoners, are the “subjects” of the supervisory system 
and thus of compliance, and have their actions and words dictated by 
compliance procedures and monitored by compliance officers. As 
noted above, WSPs specify how brokers must conduct themselves, 
and even what they should say, with respect to a given securities 
activity.88 Their actions and communications are both recorded and 
reviewed, sometimes in real time, by their immediate supervisors and 
also by compliance officers. From Foucault’s perspective, therefore, 
compliance procedures “form” brokers by controlling their conduct 
and by subjecting them to scrutiny—in sum, brokers are surrounded 
by a web of control and surveillance. As broker-dealers have come to 
use technology in this monitoring, moreover, the scrutiny to which 
brokers are subject has become real-time. 
This use of Foucault’s insight concerning soft power in the 
broker-dealer context is not intended to ignore the obvious. The 
 
 84. See id. at 133–34. 
 85. See id. at 139–40. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 146–47. 
 87. See, e.g., id. at 148–49. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
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current all-encompassing discipline and monitoring of broker-dealer 
employees by compliance officers owe much to the enhanced 
oversight of employee activities that has always typified financial 
firms. Since brokers, like bankers, insurance brokers, and commodity 
firm employees deal with cash and personal property that can be 
easily stolen or misused, they are subject to particular scrutiny.89 
Moreover, as is well known, retail investments are subject to 
heightened protection under the federal securities laws since our 
economic system would be greatly harmed if investors had no 
confidence that their assets would be safe in the hands of financial 
firms, such as broker-dealers.90 Investors would simply refuse to 
invest, which would result in funds not ending up in the hands of 
entrepreneurs and their new and higher-valued enterprises. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that employees in broker-dealers are 
subject, through SEC and FINRA regulation, to a detailed legal and 
regulatory, and thus a compliance, framework.91 In addition, as the 
financial sector has developed over time and as the regulation of it 
has grown, particularly in response to scandals, this framework and 
its accompanying compliance obligations have grown more complex. 
Moreover, as Foucault himself emphasized, a main purpose of the 
“new” disciplinary power is efficient production in whatever domain 
it is applied to. Thus, the WSPs are designed to make brokers more 
efficient and productive within the boundaries of law and regulation. 
Finally, Foucault’s account of the transformation of modern 
production is, of course, one among many (albeit a vivid one), with 
other scholars and historians calling attention to hierarchical 
techniques and other features of production that came into 
widespread existence with industrialization in the modern era.92 
 
 89. For example, many early cases on the fiduciary duties of directors involve the failure 
of bank directors to supervise employees who steal money from customers. See, e.g., Litwin v. 
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677–79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
 90. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 2–3 (12th 
ed. 2012) (discussing basic consumer protection rationale for securities regulation). 
 91. From the Foucault perspective, this important social activity, public investment, is 
exactly where the disciplinary power would be used. 
 92. See, e.g., DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME 
ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR 204–10 (1998) (discussing the transformation of labor 
relations spurred on by technological changes); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE 
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 415–54 (1977) (discussing 
the transformation in management and its elaborate hierarchies of oversight and control that 
made the large business firm possible). Moreover, there has been work discussing how 
workplace “culture” has been used as a way both to motivate and to control employees in 
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Foucault suggested, however, that this all-pervasive discipline 
and surveillance were unlikely ever to be fully achieved in any given 
domain, even in prison. First, these techniques of control could not 
hope to capture all the complex conduct and attitudes of human 
beings; this made the panopticon an unattainable ideal. Second, 
individuals resisted the techniques imposed upon them.93 Social 
psychologists and organizational scholars offer related criticisms 
about the effectiveness of this “top-down,” panoptical approach. 
They acknowledge that surveillance is effective and indeed necessary: 
psychological studies show that individuals pay particular attention 
to rules and generally do not misbehave when someone is watching 
them.94 However, they argue that this approach is difficult to put 
into practice in a way that it would successfully monitor all employee 
conduct at all times. They also suggest that such extensive oversight 
is not the most effective method of producing legally and ethically 
compliant conduct among firm employees, and may even have the 
unintended opposite result.95 
This counterproductive result could occur in the following way. 
Except on routine matters, the performance of financial activities in 
broker-dealers, such as providing investment recommendations, 
demands the exercise of considerable discretion and expertise by the 
broker. Indeed, the use of this discretion is what makes him or her a 
valued and productive employee. Admittedly, all employees in a 
broker-dealer today understand that they are in a highly regulated 
industry where compliance is a fact of life. Nonetheless, the 
compliance system embodied by the WSPs could well appear to them 
to be something external, and not reflective of their own self-
identities and self-definitions, which are centered on their productive 
securities activities and the business groups where they conduct these 
activities.96 After all, broker-dealers are profit-making firms in the 
 
knowledge-based fields, like computer engineering. See, e.g., GIDEON KUNDA, ENGINEERING 
CULTURE (rev. ed. 2006). 
 93. See FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 35, 315 (suggesting the resistance to the all-
encompassing disciplinary power).  
 94. See Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 329–30. 
 95. See id. at 323 (stating the drawbacks of a rules- or compliance-oriented approach, as 
opposed to one linked with values). 
 96. See id. at 323. This remark reflects a view that individuals have multiple “selves” or 
identities, which they adopt when they work in groups that they identify with. A productive 
broker would generally adopt the identity offered by his or her group of other brokers and 
securities personnel, at least while working within the securities business. See generally S. 
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highly competitive, profit-focused financial industry. That 
compliance, with its monitoring, reporting, recordings, reviews, 
inquiries, and inspections is the domain of non-productive, non-
business personnel and is costly97 inevitably reinforces in the 
employees’ minds the distinction between the securities business and 
the compliance function as well as the distinction between those who 
work in both sectors. Additionally, brokers know that compliance 
officers report problems to their supervisors and to senior 
management and understand that compliance officers are the “eyes 
and ears” of the SEC and FINRA. From the broker’s perspective, 
this reporting mission of compliance officers further separates 
brokers from them, especially since internal disciplinary, regulatory, 
or FINRA actions can threaten a broker’s livelihood.98 
Since, therefore, brokers will view compliance as external to their 
central business identity, even while they recognize that it is part of 
their job, there is equally a risk that they will deal with the WSPs and 
compliance policies in a routine, “check-the-box” way. In the worst 
case, they might even feel justified in evading or gaming compliance 
restrictions or trying to persuade compliance officials to ignore their 
transgressions, especially when the brokers are acting in accordance 
with their self-identity, which is formed by the attitudes of their 
business group and peers.99 Since the WSPs embody the policies of 
 
ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH 
30 (2d ed. 2004) (“[A]s a group member the self is defined stereotypically in terms of 
attributes (such as values and goals) that are shared with others who are perceived to be 
representative of the same social category.”). Anecdotally, this appears to reflect accounts of 
working in the securities industry, even for those who thought that they would never fit into 
its culture. See, e.g., JONATHAN A. KNEE, THE ACCIDENTAL INVESTMENT BANKER: INSIDE 
THE DECADE THAT TRANSFORMED WALL STREET (2006).  
 97. See generally SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASS’N, THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE IN THE 
U.S. SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SURVEY REPORT 5 (2006) (finding, based on a survey, 
compliance costs averaging 13% of net revenue (revenue less interest expenses) per firm). 
 98. A broker can be disciplined by his or her firm. If a firm has knowledge that, among 
other things, a broker has been involved in a securities violation or other regulatory violation, 
it is obligated to report this to FINRA. See FINRA Rule 4530. A broker is likely to be 
disciplined by FINRA for minor or serious violations, since FINRA acts as a first line of defense 
with respect to broker-dealers. The SEC may also bring an enforcement action against a 
broker. The disciplinary action from either FINRA or SEC enforcement proceedings ranges 
from fines to suspensions, and from practice to industry bars. See generally POSER & FANTO, 
supra note 50, at 14-1 to 14-60. 
 99. FINRA and SEC disciplinary actions bear witness that this kind of cooptation occurs 
when brokers enlist compliance officers in their wrongdoing. See, e.g., Melhado, Flynn & 
Associates, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 64468, 101 SEC DOCKET 181 (May 11, 2011) 
(recounting a settlement involving a compliance director who assisted the scheme of the CEO 
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the federal securities laws and regulations, as well as FINRA 
professional and ethical standards, brokers’ alienation from them 
means that the law, regulation, and standards, as well as their 
policies, become separated from brokers’ main activities and, indeed, 
their identity. In the parlance of social psychology and organizational 
studies, the law and policies “fade” when brokers and other 
employees involved in the securities business make important 
decisions or take other actions.100 This fading can in fact produce 
exactly the opposite of compliant conduct, for a broker’s decision 
making and behavior are then based primarily upon other 
motivations such as the self-interest and group interest that define 
the individual’s self-identity as a securities professional.101 In addition 
and more subtly, by following the letter of the WSP routines, brokers 
 
of a broker-dealer and of an investment adviser who “cherry picked” trades so as to allocate 
profitable ones to the firm’s proprietary account and later to favored hedge fund clients at the 
expense of other advisory clients). In an absolutely worst case, where they think that they can 
do it without detection or with impunity, brokers simply ignore the WSPs and compliance 
altogether. See Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Behnam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The 
Relationship between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized 
Misconduct, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1499 (2010) (presenting evidence from a broker-dealer firm 
that when a firm uses compliance as “window dressing” and divorces it from business practices, 
employees are prone to dismiss it and engage in more misconduct, which becomes 
institutionalized). 
 100. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 69–70; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, supra note 8, at 561 (discussing the phenomenon of fading). 
 101. That is, if legal and regulatory policies and professional and ethical standards do not 
come to the forefront in decision making, then other goals, needs, and desires motivate 
thought and conduct. Given that self-interest is explicitly championed as the norm 
determining conduct in the financial industry, which norm would include the group interest of 
a collection of brokers in a business division or team all working for their collective self-
interest, it is likely that self-interest will be the primary motivation for brokers. For a personal 
account of the loss of the client focus in favor of the self-interest of bankers, see KNEE, supra 
note 96, at 222–30. Psychologists explain that, if the rational, reflective self (often referred to 
as “system 2”) is not motivated to consider a particular subject, the automatic or instinctual 
self (referred to as “system 1”) reacts, and this system is oriented to self-interest. See generally 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–29 (2011) (discussing the two selves in 
general); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION 54–55 (2012) (discussing the metaphor of the automatic, emotional 
“elephant,” which is oriented towards the self, and the rational, but secondary, “rider”); Yuval 
Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, 8 (2013 draft) (discussing 
“the automaticity of self-interest”). Groups and even organizations can embrace the “self” 
orientation as their norm or as part of their organizational culture. See generally Albert 
Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 15 
(2001) (“Social structures are created by human activity, and sociostructural practices, in turn, 
impose constraints and provide enabling resources and opportunity structures for personal 
development and functioning.”). 
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may feel that they have satisfied their legal and professional 
obligations, which satisfaction liberates them to act even more 
opportunistically, and possibly unethically, in their business dealings.102 
The SEC and FINRA, and even the leaders of the brokerage 
industry, recognize that the compliance model of all-encompassing 
WSPs and the resulting surveillance are inadequate for effective 
compliance, although they do not appear to perceive the negative 
effects of external compliance. They exhort firms and brokers to 
espouse a “culture of compliance,” which, as discussed below, should 
properly refer to a different kind of compliance approach—one that 
will be characterized as an internal, rather than an external, model of 
compliance.103 After all, a basic FINRA professional standard is 
echoed in Rule 2010, which refers to conducting business with 
“high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.”104 Yet, despite the references to the culture of 
compliance, the panopticon approach remains the main one and 
continues to grow as there is a constant demand for new WSPs in 
response to new law and regulation and to SEC and FINRA 
enforcement and pronouncements. Thus, the dominant approach 
effectively drowns out the regulatory exhortations for a culture of 
compliance. 
B. The Reinforcement of the Current Compliance Orientation 
The 2007–2008 financial crisis was, among other things, the 
result of a failure of compliance in broker-dealers.105 Legal, 
regulatory, and ethical policies were pushed into the background, or 
 
 102. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing 
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1(2005) (discussing, among other things, the 
“liberating” effects of disclosure). 
 103. See, e.g., SIFMA, The Evolving Role of Compliance, supra note 49, at 27 (citing calls 
for a “culture of compliance” by various SEC officials). 
 104. See FINRA Rule 2010. 
 105. Now, several years after the onset of the crisis, there have been countless studies 
about the crisis and continuing analysis about its causes. See, e.g., THE PANIC OF 2008, supra 
note 12 (collection of essays on the topic); RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 13 
(same). Some blame the crisis on the flow of easy capital into the United States during the pre-
crisis years, while others focus on the political policies that encouraged home loans to low-
income borrowers who had no means of repaying them. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT, supra note 11, at xxv–xxvii (summarizing the debate and providing its own views). 
The only general agreement is that numerous parties, from politicians, bankers, regulators, 
investors and compliance officers, contributed to the crisis. See id. at xviii–xxiii (surveying 
responsible parties). 
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faded, in broker decision making while other human motivations, 
chiefly self-interest, crowded them out.106 To take one prominent 
example, broker-dealers were heavily involved in the securitization of 
subprime loans and the sale of the resulting mortgage-backed 
securities.107 They also created the variations of these securities, 
including the collateralized debt obligations, which were securities 
on pools of other mortgage-backed securities, and the synthetic 
instruments that mirrored their performance.108 As is now well 
known, the firms also made markets on these various instruments 
and designed specialized investments in them for sophisticated 
parties.109 A sponsor of a securitized pool had the legal obligation to 
ensure that the assets, i.e., the mortgages or asset-backed securities, 
were properly valued.110 Broker-dealers marketing the securities had 
an obligation to provide adequate disclosure of the risks associated 
with those securities.111 However, in many cases, firms did not 
properly value the assets or adequately disclose those risks.112 
Moreover, brokers were supposed to understand the products 
because without this understanding, they could not legally sell them 
 
 106. Social psychologists have written about a “calculative mindset,” which, when 
activated in a given context, leads individuals to focus on their self-interest at the expense of 
the effects of their conduct on others and on the ethics of their conduct. See Long Wang & J. 
Keith Murnighan, On Greed, 5 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 279, 295, 301 (2011). This mindset is 
more in the nature of an emotionally charged, self-oriented focus, and the mental effort 
associated with it would be less complex than moral reasoning. See id. at 298, 301. See also 
Long Wang et al., The Ethical and Social Consequences of a Calculative Mindset, 125 ORG’L 
BEHAV & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 39, 43 (2014) (reciting results of experiments showing 
that triggering a calculative mindset produces more self-interested conduct at the expense of 
social and ethical values). 
 107. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at 68–72. 
 108. See id. at 127–34. 
 109. These were derivatives based upon the mortgage-backed securities or their offspring. 
See id. at 50–51 (discussing basic credit-default swap). The involvement of investment banks in 
designing products, which banks both sold to investors and took an opposing position on, 
came particularly to light in the hearing on Goldman Sachs before the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, held on April 26–27, 2010. See SEN. PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A 
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 376–635 (Apr. 13, 2011) (detailing Goldman’s conflicts of interest in 
designing derivative securities). A low-level Goldman officer, Fabrice Tourre, involved in one 
such product was found to have violated the securities laws. See Justin Baer et al., “Fab” Trader 
Liable in Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2013 (online edition). 
 110. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at xxii. 
 111. See SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 109, at 322–
24 (summarizing these obligations). 
 112. See id. at 318–20 (summarizing these and other failings). 
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to any customer.113 Again, brokers often had little understanding of 
what they were selling and, in the worst cases, they sold products 
simply to offload them from a broker-dealer’s books.114 At times, 
these activities involved a direct violation of securities laws or 
regulations, or SRO rules. At other times, they fell into the grey area 
of running counter to professional or ethical standards.115 Since 
compliance’s mission was to ensure that all these activities were done 
in accordance with the law, regulations, and professional standards, 
these illegalities and other problems represent a wholesale 
compliance failure. 
Despite this failure, the existing external compliance model has 
since been reinforced and extended. The maintenance of the 
compliance status quo is not surprising because in the immediate 
response to the financial crisis, legislators, regulators, SROs, and 
financial firms followed the understandable strategy of trying to fill 
evident gaps in regulation and self-regulation of the financial sector 
that the crisis had exposed.116 For example, the issuance of asset-
backed securities and the conduct of the investment banks involved 
in this process are now regulated in more detail. Banks are required 
to avoid conflicts of interest in the sales of these securities and to 
enhance disclosure of any conflicts.117 All of this lawmaking, with its 
accompanying growth in SEC regulations and FINRA rules, resulted 
 
 113. See supra note 42 (summarizing suitability obligations). 
 114. See, e.g., Cody, Exchange Act Release No. 64565 (2011) (recounting facts of 
FINRA disciplinary action, upheld by the SEC, where a broker sold mortgage-backed 
securities to retail customers with practically no understanding of the products). 
 115. This would include, for example, taking advantage of a client while not literally 
violating a regulation. See, e.g., SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra 
note 109, at 425–30 (discussing Goldman Sachs’s manipulation of prices of collateralized debt 
swaps that adversely affected counterparties). 
 116. The major response is obviously Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1375, a detailed summary of which is beyond the scope of this Article. A glance through some 
of its titles, however, shows that it was clearly designed to fill in gaps, or at least perceived gaps, 
in the regulation: Title II (instituting an “orderly liquidation authority” for large financial 
firms); Title VII (among other things, bringing within regulation swaps); Title IX (among 
other things, improving the process of the sale of asset-backed securities); and Title XIV 
(reform of mortgage origination). It is natural that, in a first response to a crisis, individuals 
will use methods or tools with which they are familiar and that they have employed in the past. 
Cf. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 48–49 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000) (observing that government officials 
could fall victim equally to behavioral biases). 
 117. This is in Subtitle D of Title IX of Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1890–98. The SEC promulgated rules relating to the issuance of asset-backed securities. See 
Regulation AB, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100–1123 (2013). 
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in more work for compliance officers because they have to translate 
the rules and regulations into WSPs with accompanying monitoring, 
reporting, and inspections.118 Dodd-Frank and the SEC also used 
the existing model of compliance as it brought previously 
unregulated financial participants under regulation. For instance, a 
significant part of that legislation involved the regulation of the swap 
markets and their major participants.119 Swap dealers are now 
regulated in a manner that, understandably enough, parallels, and is 
modeled on, that of broker-dealers.120 As a result of these 
regulations, a swap dealer must have a supervisory and record-
keeping structure, which naturally demands a compliance 
function.121 
In addition, regulators and SROs enhanced their oversight of 
financial firms and their enforcement after the recent financial crisis, 
which increased the workload of compliance officers. This increased 
oversight comes in response to criticism that the regulators 
themselves failed to detect and to punish the abuses that were at the 
origin of the financial crisis.122 Both the SEC and FINRA revamped 
their examinations of broker-dealers with, among other things, the 
involvement of more specialist examiners, the sharing of information 
among their divisions (including the enforcement division), and 
more examinations targeted at firms presenting the highest risk.123 
 
 118. Compliance officers, like anybody else, have finite time and resources. The more 
time they need to write new WSPs, the less time they have for other activities. See Vass, supra 
note 49, at 10. 
 119. This is in Title VII of Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1658-1802. 
Swap regulation was divided between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
SEC, depending upon the nature of the underlying asset that was the subject of the swap.  
 120. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, at 5-40 to 5-44. 
 121. Indeed, the new section 15F(k) of the Exchange Act dealing with security-based 
swap dealer regulation mandates that such a dealer have a Chief Compliance Officer to 
implement the compliance function in the dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o–78k. 
 122. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 11, at xviii (faulting financial 
regulators with not having prevented the crisis). 
 123. The requirement to enhance examinations came indirectly out of the financial crisis, 
for it was motivated by the SEC’s failure to detect the Bernard Madoff scandal, which was 
revealed when his Ponzi scheme collapsed during the crisis. See SEC OFFICE OF 
INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD 
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME—PUBLIC VERSION (Rep. No. OIG-509, Aug. 31, 2009). The 
SEC’s enhancement of examinations was mandated by Congress in Dodd-Frank section 929U, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1867, which, among other things, added a new Section 4(h) 
to the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(h) (2012). This provision required specialized 
examiners for the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, which oversees broker-dealers. Id. 
On the SEC’s risk-based examination system, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 
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The SEC formed prosecutorial groups that target particular kinds of 
financial institutions and specific abuses.124 All of this examination 
and enforcement activity demands the attention of compliance 
officers, who generally function as the “point person” for the firm in 
regulatory examinations and assist legal officers in responding to 
enforcement inquiries.125 Moreover, the aggressive attitude of the 
SEC and FINRA examiners and enforcement personnel reinforces 
the link between compliance officers and regulators, which, as noted 
above, further separates compliance officers from the securities 
business in the eyes of brokers.126 
This reaffirmation and extension of the external model of 
compliance are a lost opportunity to think critically about the 
current orientation of compliance and may have adverse 
consequences for finance and the economy. The financial crisis 
revealed the dangers emanating from large financial conglomerates 
involved in, among other things, capital market activities, particularly 
the economic downturn and political instability that flow from the 
collapse or near collapse of these institutions.127 Compliance, of 
 
2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2013). On FINRA’s enhancement to its own 
examinations in reaction to the scandal, see SPECIAL REVIEW COMM., REPORT OF THE 2009 
SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE 
STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEMES 6–8 (Sept. 2009). 
 124. See, e.g., Robert S. Khuzami, Director of SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech (Jan. 13, 
2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm) 
(introducing the directors of the five new National Specialized Units: Asset Management, 
Market Abuse, Structured and New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Municipal 
Securities and Public Pension). 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 126. Indeed, the SEC’s recently adopted whistleblower rules, which allow a 
whistleblower to bypass internal reporting to report firm problems directly to regulators, 
particularly puts pressure on compliance officers to pass along to supervisors potential firm 
issues before a regulator learns about them from a whistleblower. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1 
to .21F-17. This regulation was promulgated pursuant to Section 922 of Dodd-Frank, codified 
at 21F of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
 127. Serious economic downturns generally follow the collapse of a financial system. See 
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 3–20 (2009). The financial sector has become large and 
concentrated in the United States, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 189–222, prone to 
boom and bust cycles, see HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 219–45 
(1986) (explaining how financial firms lead to “boom and bust” cycles through their financing 
activities, which he calls “Ponzi” finance), and with the tendency to internalize its profits and 
to externalize its losses on others, chiefly U.S. taxpayers. The ownership structure of financial 
firms, which are in corporate, not partnership form, and where employees have no long-term 
connection to them, contributes to this characteristic of firm employees capturing the profits, 
but not taking the losses, since they have often left firms before the adverse outcomes of their 
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course, cannot change financial firms in general and broker-dealers in 
particular, but it could play a critical role in reducing the instability 
and other externalities arising from financial firms. This may be 
because no other party can fulfill compliance’s particular role. After a 
crisis, legislators, regulators, and SROs often show a renewed zeal for 
law creation and enforcement, but their efforts eventually wane. 
Legislators become distracted by other, more immediate concerns. 
Regulators, like the SEC, have limited resources in this time of 
scarcity and their budgets are not growing and are unlikely to 
grow.128 Despite reforms, regulators cannot realistically be counted 
on to identify significant problems in broker-dealers ahead of time, 
for they always remain outside the firms. FINRA can improve, and 
has improved, its oversight over broker-dealers, but, while it is closer 
to these firms, its examiners and enforcement staff do not work in 
the firms on a day-to-day basis.129 
Compliance officers, by contrast, are omnipresent in the broker-
dealers and are specifically charged with legal, professional, and 
ethical compliance. Most importantly, they actually see what is 
occurring in the firms. These compliance officers are thus particularly 
well situated to alert supervisors and senior executives to growing 
problems, such as the subprime loans and their securitization, that 
may eventually infiltrate the financial industry and gradually grow 
into a systemic problem.130 Because compliance officers are involved 
 
activities appear. See generally Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking Compensation in 
Financial Firms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 13, at 197–214. The 
financial firms could contribute to political instability because they helped create a growing 
wealth disparity in this country and because they are perceived as being aligned with the 
political elite. See supra note 14. See also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN 
FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 183–201 (2010) (discussing ways to 
address inequality in the United States). They influence all political parties. See, e.g., CHARLES 
GASPARINO, BOUGHT AND PAID FOR: THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN BARACK OBAMA 
AND WALL STREET ix–xi (2010) (listing campaign donations from major financial firms and 
individuals for 2007–2010). 
 128. For a description of the SEC’s lack of adequate financial resources for its mission in 
recent years, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 
6–7 (2010). 
 129. See FINRA, Compliance Exams, available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/ 
Compliance/ComplianceExams/ (discussing FINRA’s routine compliance examinations). 
 130. The notion of this kind of problem or risk as a “virus” is useful here. This term 
comes from KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011). Systemic problems often start small 
in a marginal firm or outside the center of activities in a major firm, which means that they are 
invisible to regulators, SROs, and even senior executives in the firms. The problem then 
gradually infiltrates other firms and activities. 
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with compliance and assisting in the supervision of every broker and 
securities activity in a broker-dealer, they are perfectly positioned to 
identify problems before the problems transform into larger, 
potentially systemic issues. 
Furthermore, given the sheer number of new laws and 
regulations imposed upon broker-dealers as a result of the most 
recent financial crisis, it is doubtful whether the industry could 
survive the regulatory response to another major crisis in its present 
form. That is, the laws, regulations, and standards affecting broker-
dealers have become so numerous that it takes considerable time, 
effort, and cost for a firm, even with the help of compliance officers, 
to ensure that they are followed. These regulatory requirements lead 
to the elimination of smaller broker-dealers that cannot afford the 
regulatory burdens and inhibit firms from entering into new 
activities. The vibrancy, flexibility, and competitiveness of the 
financial industry are thus adversely affected. Highly visible, well-
functioning compliance officers, who help firm employees make 
decisions animated by legal policies and professional and ethical 
standards, could help prevent the recurrence of this cycle of crisis 
and regulation. Their activity could convince legislators, regulators, 
and, most important of all, the public that financial firms are 
dedicated to the valuable social mission that finance fulfills and are 
not simply in business for their own self-interest and are thus not in 
need of still more detailed rules of conduct. However, for 
compliance to help firms stay true to their social purpose, reduce 
their risks, and thus remain viable requires that its current external 
orientation be supplemented. 
III. THE REFORM OF COMPLIANCE 
A. A Reorientation from the External to Internal Approach 
This Part argues that compliance in broker-dealers must reorient 
its approach from the current external disciplinary model discussed 
above to an internal perspective. This does not mean that it must 
abandon its role of producer, monitor, and enforcer of the WSPs. As 
explained earlier, the external approach is necessary to prevent and 
detect major legal and ethical violations and is mandated by law and 
regulation.131 Yet compliance cannot rely only upon this approach, 
 
 131. Psychologists explain the importance and effectiveness of external oversight on 
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which results in an ever increasing number of WSPs with the 
compliance burden that this entails, which produces the resistance, 
gaming, or routine-following by brokers and which exacerbates the 
distinction between compliance and the securities business. 
Moreover, the goal of the panopticon—to watch everyone at all 
times—is unachievable.132 Rather, compliance must develop and 
promote another existing approach: internal compliance. 
The basic purpose of internal compliance is what the term 
implies: to have brokers comply because of internal motivations 
rather than only because of pressures from external rules and from 
monitoring by compliance officers.133 Naturally, brokers 
“internalize” the laws, regulations, and professional standards in 
their minds and generally organize their conduct in accordance with 
them, for one goal of the external approach is to produce this 
internal effect.134 Moreover, the laws, rules, and standards are 
intertwined with how the securities business is conducted today. 
However, the internal compliance espoused here is of a different 
order from this mental acceptance of the constraints of law and 
regulation. Under it, brokers would use the goals and policies of 
securities regulation and FINRA professional standards in their 
decision making and thus in orienting their conduct. Psychologists 
tell us that a person’s beliefs and actions will best reflect such goals, 
policies, and standards if the person—a broker in this case—
understands them as being implicated in his or her everyday work 
decisions and conduct.135 That is, the goals, policies, and standards 
come to mind in decision making because they are part of brokers’ 
self-identity, and thus they contend with, and even suppress, other 
motivations such as the self-interest that may characterize brokers’ 
business identity and that of their business group.136 This internal 
 
compliance. See supra note 94.  
 132. Of course, with advances in technology, it is conceivable that nearly every word and 
action of a broker could be captured in some way and thus monitored in real time. But this 
kind of monitoring will still be costly and one suspects that human ingenuity can find a way to 
game it. 
 133. See Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 320 (noting how a values-based compliance 
orientation is part of an employee’s identity). 
 134. See id. at 323 (discussing how an external compliance orientation affects an 
employee’s internal calculations about how to conduct himself or herself). 
 135. See id. at 320–21 (discussing a values-based orientation, as opposed to a compliance 
one, which motivates employees by appealing to the congruence of the organizational values 
and those of employees). 
 136. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 153–54 (discussing the power of 
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approach is particularly important for compliance in knowledge-
intensive tasks like brokerage, where, to be productive, an employee 
must be given considerable discretion in how to perform the job at 
hand. Again, the external approach monitors, to the extent it can, 
the exercise of discretion while the internal approach will use 
discretion to foster compliance. 
Once again, to use an example from suitability, in recommending 
securities or strategies to a customer, a broker is mandated to find 
those “suitable” to the customer in light of his or her investment 
holdings and goals, time horizon for investing, liquidity needs, risk 
tolerance, etc.137 In making the recommendation, the broker has 
considerable discretion among the possible products and strategies. 
It is certainly conceivable that a “suitable” product might favor the 
broker or his or her firm in some way, such as by an enhanced 
commission or because of its sponsorship by an affiliated firm.138 A 
supervisor’s review and compliance monitoring (or customer 
complaints) will likely identify only clear suitability violations and will 
thus have little effect upon the broker’s discretion. By contrast, 
internal compliance would be designed to promote customer service 
and benefit as the animating goals, policies, or standards for the 
broker’s decision making in this context. With such an orientation, 
the broker would be inclined to use discretion in the client’s favor, 
i.e., in this case, to recommend a suitable, but low-cost product. An 
even broader principle applicable in these circumstances would be 
fostering customer trust, and therefore involvement, in the financial 
industry and the securities markets, which ultimately allows for an 
efficient use of capital in society. The purpose of internal compliance 
is, therefore, to have the brokers, on their own, live up to FINRA’s  
 
 
 
the “want” self). In psychological terms, these other motivations, particularly those centering 
on the self, are often “implicit” or automatic, and thus powerful. See generally John A. Bargh 
& Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 
468–69 (1999). 
 137. See supra notes 42, 64 and accompanying text. 
 138. Under the suitability rule, a broker does not have to recommend a product that is 
the lowest in terms of commissions and fees; he or she must recommend one that, on the basis 
of all the factors involved, is suitable to the client. A broker would violate the suitability 
obligation, however, if, all things being equal, he or she recommended a product specifically to 
maximize his or her own profit. See FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 12-25, SUITABILITY: 
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S NEW SUITABILITY RULE, at 4 (2012). 
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“high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.”139 
The internal approach is already part of compliance, which is why 
it would be a reorientation or a reemphasis in this field. When 
talking about effective compliance, compliance officers often refer to 
a “culture of compliance” in their broker-dealer firm or to the fact 
that the firm has a certain “tone at the top.”140 These words must 
refer to a way of thinking about or a perspective on compliance that 
reflects internalized attitudes in firm employees. In other words, in a 
firm with a “good” culture, compliance officers say that they can 
generally trust the brokers and supervisors to make legal and ethical 
decisions and thus conduct themselves in line with the firm’s goals of 
customer service and benefit, which, in turn, reflect the law and 
professional standards. In such a firm, a compliance officer can rely 
upon the brokers themselves to be compliant and to enforce 
compliance among one another.141 Compliance officers are called in 
only if there are new issues or problems, the compliance issue is not 
obvious and brokers need to discuss it with a compliance specialist, 
or a broker just wants confirmation about his or her approach. 
To create this internal compliance, a compliance officer needs to 
ensure that the goals and policies of securities laws and professional 
standards are always in the foreground of brokers’ minds when they 
are making business and client decisions—in other words, to ensure 
 
 139. See FINRA Rule 2010, supra note 104. The examples of a broker’s ability to 
exercise discretion in everyday tasks, despite detailed FINRA rules, are numerous (e.g., how 
and where to execute orders, conducting sales seminars). Of course, there are examples where 
rules leave the broker little room for discretion. See, e.g., NASD Rule 3040, [2009–2014 
Transfer Binder] FINRA Manual (Wolters Kluwer) 17353 (2014) (a broker cannot engage in a 
private securities transaction without first having provided written notice to his or her firm). 
 140. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also SIFMA, The Evolving Role of 
Compliance, supra note 49, at 5 (“At the same time, Compliance’s strongest contribution may 
be to help the business shape appropriate standards and adopt practices that promote the right 
behaviors from the very start.”); TAMAR FRANKEL, LEGAL DUTIES OF FIDUCIARIES 312 
(2012) (discussing the importance of leaders in the culture of legal compliance). 
 141. See generally Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: 
Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
1, 6–7, 21 (2010) (finding that the characteristics of the organization, such as its ethical 
culture and climate, have a considerable influence on unethical decisions in the firm; with 
“ethical climate” meaning the broad “organizational procedures, policies, and practices with 
moral” dimensions and values, and “ethical culture” meaning a narrower concept of an 
organization’s systems, procedures, and practices for guiding and supporting ethical conduct). 
Interestingly, the literature cited by the authors suggests that the existence of a code of 
conduct, the paradigm of the external compliance system, has little deterrent effect on 
unethical conduct. See id. at 13. 
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that the goals and policies do not “fade” in a given decision.142 This 
purpose changes the nature of the compliance officer’s role from 
being only a monitor of employee performance of WSPs to being an 
advocate and educator for the policies and standards behind them. 
The compliance officer would help identify the goals, policies, and 
standards for decision making with respect to a particular broker-
dealer activity, whether it be trading, advising, managing accounts, 
or selling products.143 A compliance officer is well suited for this role 
because he or she is close to decisions that happen at every level of 
the firm and has historically been an advisor to brokers. Moreover, 
compliance’s connection to the granular nature of decision making 
in financial firms ensures that a compliance officer is also available to 
respond appropriately to broker inquiries about the application of 
policies and standards on specific issues. Furthermore, in everyday 
decision making, compliance officers can present to other employees 
a model of thinking and conduct—to act as a kind of moral compass, 
which itself has been shown to be important in reducing illegal and 
unethical conduct and organizational conflict in firms.144 
 
 142. The view of human decision making offered and accepted here is that conscious, 
deliberative reflection (System 2) can override automatic (System 1) and other motivations, so 
long as a space and time are given to the former. See supra note 8 (on ethical fading); see also 
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 141, at 20 (finding that unethical conduct is reduced when 
certain characteristics of the moral issue involved are highlighted, in particular the magnitude of 
the consequences of the conduct, their probability, the proximity of the victim, and the 
foregrounding of social norms); Mark N. Bing et al., An Experimental Investigation of an 
Interactive Model of Academic Cheating Among Business School Students, 11 ACAD. MGMT. 
LEARNING & EDUC. 28, 39 (2012) (showing that cheating by students declines when they are 
reminded of their school’s ethics codes and specifically instructed on how prohibited conduct is 
detected and punished); Guido Palazzo et al., Ethical Blindness, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 323 (2012) 
(discussing how “ethical blindness” is created—where “ethical blindness” means that a person 
adopts a rigid perspective, often as a result of complex causes, including organizational and 
institutional structures, that closes out other frameworks, such as ethics). Of course, as will be 
discussed below, illegal and unethical conduct can occur as a result of deliberative reasoning. 
 143. A compliance officer can elucidate the legal and ethical aspects of an employee’s 
decision making by raising the legal and ethical issues in his or her conversation with the 
employee. See Brian C. Gunia et al., Contemplation and Conversation: Subtle Influences on 
Moral Decision Making, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 17, 22 (2012) (finding that this kind of 
conversation, as opposed to conversation focusing on self-interest, leads to more ethical 
decisions). On the other hand, acting on self-interested impulses and conversing on a self-
interested basis can “prime” future decisions to follow the self-interest motivation. See id. at 
27. In other words, conversation here is used to counteract decision making that is “primed” 
by automatic motivations. 
 144. In a related vein, social psychologists have demonstrated that leaders who have 
internalized moral values and who give public expression to them help produce organizations 
that have less unethical conduct and less inter-organization conflict (i.e., among members). 
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The internal approach faces daunting challenges in 
implementation. This approach sets for itself the task of creating a 
complex personal and social identity for brokers, which would value 
deliberation on legal policies and professional standards and which 
must push aside, or at least check, other individual and group 
identities at odds with it, such as an individual’s and a division’s 
single-minded pursuit of profit.145 To accomplish this task, 
compliance must use the guidance of psychologists, social 
psychologists, organizational theorists, and even neuroscientists 
about how best to encourage the creation of this identity and 
individual attributes that will together lead to internal compliance. 
Scholars in these disciplines offer guidance on how to create legally 
compliant and ethical individuals and organizations.146 The learning 
of these scholars must be used to help train compliance officers, 
who, without pretending to be psychologists, must understand the 
goal that they are trying to achieve and the empirically established 
methods and techniques needed to achieve that goal.147 Shifting the 
 
They hypothesize that this may be due to the fact that organization members model their 
conduct on the leader, who generally typifies the “ideal” of the group. See David M. Mayer et 
al., Who Displays Ethical Leadership, and Why Does It Matter? An Examination of Antecedents 
and Consequences of Ethical Leadership, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 151, 153–54 (2012). This is a 
social identity approach, where a group or organization’s identity, which its members accept, is 
greatly formed by its leader. However, it is by no means certain that ethical leaders alone will 
create a culture of values or a beneficial social identity in broker-dealers. See Joel Gehman et al., 
Values Work: A Process Study of the Emergence and Performance of Organizational Values 
Practices, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 84, 108 (2013) (rejecting the view that organizational values 
come from the “top-down” and are relatively stable, but arguing instead that, constantly 
subject to change and refinement, it is locally and “through discussions, negotiations, and 
ongoing network reconfigurations that values practices are performed”). 
 145. See supra note 136. 
 146. See, e.g., BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 152–65 (discussing ways to 
improve ethical decision making in oneself and in organizations). Awrey, Blair, and Kershaw 
use the work of organizational theorists to discuss how conduct in financial firms can be made 
more ethical and “other regarding,” essentially by having processes devoted to raising ethical 
concerns in this conduct. They discuss some of these processes in the context of U.K. financial 
regulation. See Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and 
Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013). 
 147. To take one example, compliance officers could learn techniques for screening 
brokers to detect those who might have a propensity for ethical or unethical conduct. As 
Giacalone and Promislo observe in the academic context, it is useful to be aware of how 
individuals possess a mindset prone to or primed for ethical failings so that educators can 
address it. See Giacalone & Promislo, supra note 20, at 94–95. For a recent example of this 
propensity, see Christopher M. Matthews, Ex-SAC Portfolio Manager Martoma Was Expelled 
from Harvard Law School, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2014 7:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702304347904579310882291980594 (manager who was 
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emphasis from external to internal compliance will not happen 
overnight, and compliance officers have to recognize and maintain 
the psychological effectiveness of an external control system as a 
check on illegal and unethical conduct. Indeed, the complexity of 
human thinking and behavior demands this external check so that 
brokers do not override their ethical self.148 In sum, the challenge of 
 
criminally prosecuted for insider trading had earlier doctored his law school transcript). 
Compliance officers would also need to learn techniques for triggering ethical thinking in 
decision making. Some of these techniques are as easy as raising ethical or legal issues before a 
decision is made. See, e.g., BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 8, at 156–57. Even 
automatic, rather than deliberative, processes could be used by compliance officers to create 
ethical conduct. Significant research is now being done on how to “prime” or trigger ethical 
conduct, particularly in high-performance, cognitively intensive settings. See generally David T. 
Welsh & Lisa D. Ordóñez, Conscience Without Cognition: The Effects of Subconscious Priming 
on Ethical Behavior, 57 ACAD. MGM,T. J. 723 (2014). Among other things, Welsh and 
Ordóñez observe that people act ethically in order to maintain their self-concept as an ethical 
person and that the key to motivating ethical conduct is to cause them to see a decision or 
conduct as raising the ethical decision framework. They find that, in high-cognitive activities 
with demanding performance goals, subconscious priming, which operates almost 
automatically (e.g., through the use of symbols, images, stories, etc. in the workplace) and 
does not use much of an individual’s cognitive resources, may be best in triggering ethical 
decision making, particularly where constant monitoring is unavailable. 
 148. The reference here is to, among other things, emerging research that the conduct of 
individuals in financial firms may be influenced by hormones, such as testosterone, which 
promotes risk-taking, or cortisone, which decreases it. It is thus possible that neurobiological 
influences could override ethical decision making, which would require an external system to 
guard against such conduct. See John M. Coates et al., From Molecule to Market: Steroid 
Hormones and Financial Risk-Taking, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 331, 337–39 
(2010) (discussing the influence of such hormones and ways to guard against their negative 
effects); see also JOHN COATES, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG AND WOLF: RISK TAKING, GUT 
FEELINGS, AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST (2012) (discussing biological basis for risk-
taking in securities trading). Moreover, simply triggering the deliberative self to focus on legal 
policies and ethical standards may not be enough to produce ethical decisions since, in certain 
circumstances, individuals can use deliberative cognitive processes to override ethical values 
(i.e., to convince themselves that they do not matter), a process known as “moral 
disengagement.” See Dean A. Shepherd et al., “I Care About Nature, but . . .”: Disengaging 
Values in Assessing Opportunities That Cause Harm, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1251 (2013) (finding, 
in a study of entrepreneurs, that those with high views of their own abilities, operating in a 
highly competitive environment, override their own environmental values; suggesting that in 
such environments, strong legal frameworks may be necessary to prevent violations). On how 
moral disengagement occurs, see generally Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral 
Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364 
(1996). For a discussion of the classic processes of moral disengagement: justifying detrimental 
action (i) by classifying it as moral, (ii) by diffusing the responsibility for it, (iii) by disregarding 
or distorting its consequences, and (iv) by blaming the victims for one’s actions. Indeed, 
Bandura explains that, under social cognitive theory, improper conduct is regulated by social 
(i.e., external) sanctions as well as by “internalized self-sanctions.” See id. at 372. Thus, 
external sanctions can be useful in light of the risk of disengagement of the self-sanctions. See 
Weaver & Treviño, supra note 5, at 327–30 (finding that a compliance-based approach—what 
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compliance is to achieve a reorientation towards an internal system 
while maintaining an external system that does not squeeze out 
other approaches. 
This reorientation would require a significant change in the 
perspective of regulators like the SEC or SROs like FINRA. In 
particular, FINRA would have to alter its approach of responding to 
every new problem or development in the brokerage industry by 
requiring a broker-dealer to add new WSPs. It would be difficult as a 
policy and organizational matter for FINRA to change its rules-based 
orientation because this approach has characterized FINRA’s dealings 
with broker-dealers for a long time. To take one example, FINRA’s 
examiners demand, as evidence of a broker-dealer’s supervision of a 
given business activity, written proof of a firm’s WSPs, the firm’s 
records of compliance with the WSPs, and a chart of the hierarchy of 
supervisors.149 By contrast, if an examiner were to evaluate whether a 
firm had an adequate internal compliance and customer-centric 
culture in place, he or she would have to spend considerable time in 
the firm to see how supervision and compliance operated in 
practice.150 In addition, management of FINRA’s member firms also 
benefits from FINRA’s espousal of the external approach and may 
resist any change to it. After all, broker-dealer executives can delegate 
the responsibility for compliance to the compliance officers, whose 
success or failure can be measured by the number of WSPs and their 
enforcement, as well as the absence of significant enforcement actions 
against the firm and its employees. Even if a problem occurs in a firm, 
the firm and an executive can often rely upon the existence of a 
compliance system as a defense to supervisory liability, as discussed 
above. By contrast, internal compliance in a firm will require 
significant commitment from and involvement by top management, 
as the psychological literature suggests. 
  
 
I have termed an external approach—deters unethical and illegal conduct, but produces less of 
a commitment to an organization’s values than does a values-based approach, which leads the 
authors to believe that a compliance-based approach is effective only when coupled with a 
meaningful values-based approach).  
 149. On SEC and FINRA examinations, see generally Matthew C. Dwyer, Preparing for 
Broker-Dealer Examinations, 5 PRAC. COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. FOR SEC. INDUSTRY 21 
(May–June 2012), available at http://www.mcd-
consulting.com/attachments/File/Dwyer_PCRM_05-12.pdf. 
 150. Now an examiner might simply demand to see a firm’s Code of Ethics and any 
statements by senior executives about the importance of ethics. 
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A challenge to the reemphasis on internal compliance is, 
therefore, convincing FINRA and its member firms to go along 
with, and to assist in, this reform. This Article argues to FINRA, as 
well as to its member firms, that the reform will promote the 
professional standards and culture that FINRA and its members have 
always espoused and that are central to the concept of self-
regulation.151 The reform will also make compliance more effective 
and will not result in abandoning the external supervisory system, 
but will supplement it.152 Another argument will likely appeal also to 
FINRA’s membership, and possibly to FINRA itself: that the turn to 
internal compliance will eventually reduce the regulatory burden on 
broker-dealers as there will be less need for new FINRA rules, WSPs, 
and the accompanying FINRA oversight.153 
Moreover, FINRA is unlikely to reorient the current compliance 
approach on its own, especially since it is subject to SEC oversight as 
an SRO.154 Thus, the change would require convincing the SEC to 
allow FINRA to promote the internal approach as well as to do the 
same itself. The SEC should be receptive to the compliance 
reorientation since it adopts a policy-based approach in much of its 
own regulation of broker-dealers, which echoes the statutory 
framework of the Exchange Act that offers general mandates, rather 
than detailed rules, in this area.155 It is true that the duty of 
supervision, as well as the defense to a failure to supervise, which is 
the foundation upon which external supervision and compliance 
have been built, is driven by avoidance of SEC prosecution and thus 
reinforces external compliance.156 However, the defense is arguably 
 
 151. See FINRA Rule 2010, supra note 104 (referring to “standards of commercial honor 
and . . . principles of trade”). 
 152. This “gradualist” approach, or an approach that simply shifts the emphasis in 
compliance, may be more psychologically acceptable to FINRA executives as it is to 
most people. 
 153. Professors Birdthistle and Henderson have argued that FINRA has evolved from an 
SRO into a quasi-governmental agency and thus has an institutional interest in maintaining the 
current emphasis upon rules and external compliance, which reinforces one reason for its 
existence. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2013) (discussing the “public choice” explanation for why 
FINRA likes the current situation). 
 154. See supra notes 1–2. 
 155. Again, an obvious example is the requirement of the supervisory system, which, as 
discussed above, is a general defense in the Exchange Act, but an extremely detailed broker-
dealer mandate in FINRA rules. See supra text accompanying notes 23–46. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 26–36. 
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broad enough to include both the internal approach to compliance 
and a detailed supervisory system with WSPs. The SEC could 
interpret an effective supervisory system as one that must have 
internal compliance as one component. 
The challenge will be convincing the SEC to allow FINRA to 
promote the reemphasis on internal compliance. It is one thing for 
the SEC to publicize the culture of compliance, as it does today, 
when it can rely upon FINRA to impose a heavily rule-based external 
compliance approach on firms; it is another thing for the SEC to 
take the same approach without the protection of FINRA’s detailed 
rule-making and rule-monitoring. The SEC would be concerned 
about the perception that it is too soft on the securities industry by 
approving a FINRA reorientation toward internal compliance and by 
allowing FINRA to emphasize rules and external compliance. The 
SEC would fear the occurrence of a situation like those in the past157 
where investors were harmed by conduct not explicitly forbidden or 
addressed by specific rules. Critics would accuse the SEC of having 
forgotten these past failings of self-regulation and of being too 
accommodating to broker-dealers and to the securities industry.158 
Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that, just by appealing to its 
commitment to a culture of compliance, the SEC will be convinced 
to approve the dilution of FINRA’s current emphasis upon the 
external compliance approach, especially since the SEC occupies a 
difficult political position—it is short on resources, but then blamed 
for scandals in the securities markets.159 Moreover, the SEC could 
contend that it has now struck the right balance between internal 
and external compliance by promoting the culture of compliance 
itself while leaving to FINRA the imposition of detailed rules that 
engender the external-compliance system. However, the SEC must 
understand that the balance is illusory, that the domination of the 
external approach squeezes out the internal and, therefore, that the 
SEC needs to alter the orientation if compliance is to succeed in its 
mission. The important question then becomes what will convince 
 
 157. See supra note 43 (discussing the case that led to FINRA’s imposition of a rule 
requiring the testing of supervisory systems, with particular attention to specific issues like the 
safeguarding of customer assets). 
 158. See generally POSER & FANTO, supra note 50, § 1.01 n.3 (listing these failures). 
 159. See STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, supra note 128 (discussing the 
SEC’s budgetary constraints). On being blamed for scandals, see supra note 123 (discussing 
the blame placed on the SEC for Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). 
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the SEC to take the initial steps, apart from persuading it of the 
theoretical merits of the internal approach in producing compliant 
conduct.160 It would be worthwhile, then, if the SEC, as well as 
FINRA, could be provided with ways of measuring the effectiveness 
of the internal approach, which would provide them with tangible 
signs of its benefits. 
B. The Conditions to the Reorientation 
1. Measurements of the value of the internal approach 
One would expect that, over time, the overall incidents of illegal 
and unethical conduct would decrease in the brokerage industry if 
internal compliance took hold—otherwise, this approach would have 
little or no value. This decrease could be measured by the number of 
SEC and FINRA disciplinary actions aimed at individuals as well as 
meritorious customer complaints and arbitration actions.161 
Accordingly, one could persuade the SEC and FINRA to promote 
the internal approach by arguing that its effect could be empirically 
measured over time. The problem here, however, would be proof of 
causation because, as mentioned above, the internal approach is not 
meant to replace the external approach but rather to supplement it. 
Thus, any decrease in legal, rule, and standard violations could be 
due to the enhanced effectiveness of the external system as well as 
 
 160. If the SEC were to emphasize the internal approach, that emphasis might provide 
the brokerage industry with an important example of the SEC’s appreciation of the 
predicament of broker-dealer firms that must deal with a seemingly unending number of costly 
new regulations and rules as well as the resultant need for new WSPs. This cost issue has been 
particularly highlighted by court cases striking down SEC rules because the SEC has done an 
inadequate economic analysis of the associated costs. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down an SEC rule requiring public companies to allow 
certain large shareholders to nominate directors on the company’s annual proxy statement). 
But the only way in which the promotion of internal compliance would be meaningful, as 
opposed to the SEC’s current lip service to the culture of compliance, would be if, as the 
internal approach takes hold in firms, the SEC and FINRA would not increase, and might 
actually decrease, the number of rules affecting broker-dealers. 
 161. FINRA provides basic annual data on investor complaints and disciplinary actions 
that FINRA enforcement has brought. See FINRA Statistics & Data, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated Aug. 19, 2014); see 
also Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResou
rces/Statistics/ (last updated Sept. 16, 2014). The SEC provides annual data on enforcement 
actions in an annual report. See, e.g., Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2012, SEC.GOV, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2014). 
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renewed FINRA and SEC enforcement or threat of enforcement or 
it could be the result of applying the internal approach or some 
combination of the two. In any event, causation for the decline in 
disciplinary actions is likely to be muddied and difficult to establish, 
and the decline might take considerable time to appear. Thus, these 
statistics would not be useful, without further exploration, in 
justifying to the SEC and FINRA that they can measure the 
effectiveness of the reorientation to the internal approach. 
Since the ultimate goal of internal compliance is to change the 
culture of a broker-dealer so as to prevent misconduct and to 
promote customer-oriented behavior, the better measure of its 
effectiveness would be the decline in instances of widespread 
misconduct and questionable practices in firms. In other words, if 
the internal approach takes hold in firms, one would expect to see 
fewer instances of institutional misconduct. These are not situations 
where the rules or professional standards are inadequate, but where 
the rules and standards are ignored or gamed throughout an 
organization or a significant part of it.162 These situations are also 
most damaging to the securities industry because they generally 
reveal abuses of numerous customers as employees and even 
supervisors put their own self-interest over customer interests. As 
noted earlier, the external approach is not effective in addressing this 
phenomenon because monitoring cannot be omnipresent and 
because external monitoring by compliance officers is generally 
gamed or simply ignored where there is a weak culture, widespread 
acceptance of illegal and questionable conduct, and/or the 
participation or willful blindness of supervisors. 
Perhaps the SEC and FINRA could be persuaded to promote the 
internal approach through a pilot program. One could argue to 
them that there will be a way to measure the program’s effectiveness 
by tabulating the instances of institutionalized misconduct in the 
securities industry. Again, these would be cases where an entire firm, 
or a significant part of it, such as a branch or a division, is engaged in 
the misconduct. That is, the prohibited behavior would not involve 
legal, rule, or professional-standard violations by a few individuals or 
in a small broker-dealer, even if the violations were serious in nature. 
It would also include instances where the misconduct appeared in a 
 
 162. Institutionalized misconduct clearly appeared in many of the firms involved in the 
packaging and selling of mortgage-backed securities. See supra text accompanying notes 105–115. 
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number of firms or was even industry-wide. These cases are generally 
typified by a charge of failure to supervise leveled against the firm 
and its top executives for numerous violations and even widespread 
corruption throughout an entire firm or in a significant part of it.163 
The cases would also be brought to light as a result of numerous 
customer complaints directed at many firm employees as opposed to 
at just one “rogue” broker. 
As mentioned above, the SEC and FINRA now provide general 
statistics on their enforcement actions, as well as their results. FINRA 
also similarly tabulates customer complaints in arbitration. More 
significantly, FINRA’s disciplinary actions are available online, and 
the SEC publishes its individual enforcement proceedings on its 
website.164 From this information, it is possible to arrive at an annual 
assessment of institutionalized misconduct in the brokerage industry. 
It should then be possible to compare this assessment from year to 
year, as controlled for other factors such as the number of broker-
dealers and branches.165 The proposal would recommend that the 
SEC and FINRA evaluate the success of the internal approach over 
at least ten years in its pilot program. The data in the initial years of 
 
 163. A recent example, although an investment adviser and not a broker-dealer, is the 
SEC’s charge of failure to supervise against Steven A. Cohen, the owner of S.A.C. Capital, 
because of the allegation of widespread insider trading in his firm. See Steven A. Cohen, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3634 (July 19, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov. 
FINRA is clearly interested in cases of organizational corruption. See, e.g., 2014 Exam 
Priorities Overview Letter of Daniel M. Sibears, Executive Vice President, Member Regulation 
Programs 3 (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry 
/@ip/@reg/@guide/ documents/industry/p419710.pdf (discussing FINRA’s plan to track 
brokers who formerly worked at severely disciplined firms because they may be bringing illegal 
and unethical practices to their new firms). 
 164. FINRA’s disciplinary actions are available at FINRA Disciplinary Actions Online 
Database, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/
DisciplinaryActions/ FDAS/. In addition, FINRA publishes monthly descriptions of 
disciplinary resolutions for that month, which in turn hyperlink to the actual decision on its 
website database. The SEC’s litigation part of its website, Litigation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml, has links to SEC decisions, litigation 
releases, and results of administrative proceedings, among other things, which together provide 
access to individual decisions. FINRA also provides access to arbitration awards. But these 
would be less helpful since arbitrators typically do not write opinions or provide a justification 
for their decisions. See FINRA Arbitration Awards Online Database, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationandMediation/FormsTools/p018127. 
 165. That is, the number of broker-dealer firms has been steadily declining, while the 
number of brokers or other representatives has stabilized and even recently increased. See 
FINRA Statistics & Data, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/. 
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the program will not reflect the success (or lack thereof) of the 
internal approach; institutional misconduct does not happen 
overnight and the internal approach needs several years to take hold 
in firms as a result of FINRA’s and the SEC’s efforts (to be discussed 
below). Thus, the data in years 6–10 will be more indicative of the 
success of the approach than that in years 1–5. 
The SEC and FINRA should also commission a survey of 
brokerage employees to elicit “soft” information about the effect of 
the adoption of the internal compliance approach.166 They should do 
a survey before undertaking to promote the internal approach as a 
way of establishing a benchmark for the current situation of 
compliance in the brokerage industry. They could then conduct the 
same survey at regular intervals, for example every five years, to 
measure the progress of the adoption of the internal approach in 
firms. Firms would need to be careful to break down this data in 
accordance with firm size because smaller firms will likely find the 
adoption of the internal approach more challenging. Smaller firms 
are in a more precarious economic position and the temptation to 
push aside legal and professional standards for profits will be greater 
in them. Similar surveys should also be done with brokerage clients, 
both retail and institutional.167 If the internal approach is succeeding, 
one would expect that employees would reflect that compliance is an 
important part of their firm’s culture and that customers would echo 
that firms and brokers are increasingly customer-centered. 
These ways of measuring the value of the internal compliance 
approach may persuade the SEC and FINRA to promote internal 
compliance, at least in a pilot program and then ultimately to adopt 
internal compliance as a part of broker-dealer compliance. However, 
there is little possibility that the data will show a decline in 
institutional misconduct unless they actively support its 
implementation in broker-dealers as opposed to today’s situation of 
giving lip service to the culture of compliance while steadily 
 
 166. See Niki A. Den Nieuwenboer & Muel Kaptein, Spiraling Down into Corruption: A 
Dynamic Analysis of the Social Identity Processes That Cause Corruption in Organizations to 
Grow, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 133 (2008) (discussing research methods for identifying 
organizational corruption, including surveying employees about the organizational norms and 
scope for misconduct in their firms). 
 167. The SEC has commissioned similar studies in the past. See, e.g., ANGELA A. HUNG 
ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2008) (investigating, among other things, 
how well investors understood the duties of their financial advisors). 
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reinforcing the external approach. It is time then to turn to a 
discussion of how they can specifically promote internal compliance. 
2. Initial steps by the SEC and FINRA to promote internal compliance 
The question arises whether the SEC should adopt the 
reorientation toward internal compliance through an official notice 
and comment procedure.168 Since, as noted above, the reorientation 
is only a reordering of existing compliance approaches, the SEC is 
arguably not doing anything fundamentally new here, which is what 
happens when it decides to give special examination or enforcement 
attention to a particular problem or area of financial activity. It is 
thus within the SEC’s authority to engage in this reorientation as a 
policy matter, which would not demand any notice and comment.169 
However, it may be advisable for the SEC to accomplish this 
reorientation through a notice and comment procedure in order to 
effectively implement the reorientation itself and to deal with any 
opposition to it. This procedure would have the SEC highlight 
internal compliance in a policy statement,170 explain its orientation, 
and suggest the ways in which it could be accomplished in a firm. 
This procedure also has the advantage of allowing broker-dealers and 
other interested parties to raise problems or issues with it and its 
implementation that might not otherwise be known. Moreover, 
since internal compliance could involve new costs to broker-dealers 
as compliance officers spend more time on advising employees or 
designing ways of triggering lawful and professional conduct, the 
SEC might discuss the costs in terms of the benefits of having more 
compliant firms, as measured in the ways discussed above.171 
  
 
 168. This procedure is required by a federal agency when it issues a “substantive,” as 
opposed to an interpretive, rule or policy. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.  
 169. The SEC could contend that it is interpreting the statutory defense to supervisory 
liability, see text accompanying notes 29–30, by requiring the promotion of internal 
compliance as part of the defense. It is not clear that the SEC need even go so far since it is 
really taking a policy position on effective compliance. 
 170. Here the SEC would be clarifying its position on compliance. In the alternative, it 
could issue a “concept release” as a prelude to doing actual rulemaking on internal compliance. 
 171. If the SEC’s support for internal compliance is considered substantive, it would be 
under a legal obligation, among other things, to evaluate its effect upon smaller broker-dealers. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 603. On the other hand, insofar as the SEC is making a policy pronouncement 
encouraging, but not mandating, broker-dealers to adopt internal compliance, it would avoid 
the difficult cost/benefit analysis and controversy that comes with it today. 
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Another possible, and perhaps even preferable, approach would 
be to have FINRA, rather than the SEC, propose the compliance 
reorientation through a new rule or an amendment to an existing 
rule.172 This approach makes sense because the emphasis on internal 
compliance is an ideal subject for FINRA action, given that it 
concerns the internal governance and supervision of broker-dealers. 
Although there are several possibilities for the rule, the best 
approach is to have FINRA propose an additional supplementary 
material to FINRA Rule 3130, which, as noted earlier, has the CCO 
requirement for firms and the CEO’s certification as to compliance 
after consultation with the CCO.173 This Rule now includes 
supplementary material that, among other things, describes the 
importance of compliance processes, the role of the CCO, and the 
responsibility for compliance.174 The proposed supplementary 
material about internal compliance could read as follows: 
.11 Internal Compliance. An important task of the CCO and the 
other compliance officers is to promote “internal compliance” in a 
member. Internal compliance means that associated persons use the 
goals and policies of federal securities regulation and FINRA 
professional standards, as well as ethics, in their decision making 
and thus in orienting their conduct in addition to their compliance 
with federal laws and regulations and FINRA rules. For this 
purpose, compliance officers would be expected to assist associated 
persons to make decisions and otherwise to conduct themselves in 
accordance with these goals, policies, standards, and ethics. This 
assistance would include providing advice on compliance to 
associated persons, conducting appropriate training on legal, 
professional, and ethical obligations and otherwise creating an 
environment in a firm conducive to appropriate decision making 
and conduct. The goal of internal compliance is to have associated 
persons who would be legally, professionally, and ethically 
compliant. 
Having FINRA issue the addition to Rule 3130’s supplementary 
material allows, at a minimum, for a two-stage comment process. 
First, broker-dealers and other interested parties could offer 
comments to FINRA’s proposed addition, which would be issued in 
 
 172. Alternatively, FINRA, rather than the SEC, could issue a policy statement 
promoting internal compliance. 
 173. See supra notes 46–47. 
 174. See FINRA Rule 3130.03, .05, .06. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 5:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1176 
a regulatory notice.175 Second, before approving FINRA’s rule 
change, the SEC would put the supplementary material out for 
further comment.176 In the SEC’s request for comment, as well as in 
its eventual approval of the rule change, the SEC can underline the 
importance of internal compliance in broker-dealers and put its 
weight clearly behind the approach. 
In addition to proposing the new supplementary material, 
FINRA and SEC officials must take other actions to promote the 
reorientation from external to internal compliance. FINRA would do 
what it typically does whenever it is setting forth a new rule or 
policy: its senior officers would publicize internal compliance in their 
speeches in various industry fora and on FINRA’s website while 
FINRA examiners would make it an examination priority.177 
Moreover, as a result of examinations, FINRA might well issue a 
report about the practices in different firms with respect to their 
creating internal compliance as a way of highlighting particularly 
successful models used by firms.178 Furthermore, behind every 
FINRA rule, and thus its requirement for specific WSPs, are the 
goals, policies, and standards that the rule is intended to promote. 
Indeed, FINRA officials often refer to the policies in their speeches, 
and FINRA regulatory notices similarly highlight the policies.179 
Therefore, whenever it issues a notice, FINRA should ensure that 
 
 175. Occasionally, FINRA will issue several regulatory notices as to a particular proposal 
if the initial one receives significant comments and if, as a result, FINRA must reissue it to take 
into account changes suggested by commentators. 
 176. The notice and comment period of a proposed FINRA rule is governed by 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b) and by 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4. The understanding here is that the proposed 
new supplementary material would not be a “stated policy, practice, or interpretation with 
respect to the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.” See 15 U.S.C. § 
78s(b)(3)(A) (governing rules that take effect immediately upon filing). 
 177. For example, each year FINRA sets forth its examination priorities for the upcoming 
examinations. See, e.g., 2014 Exam Priorities Overview Letter of Daniel M. Sibears, Executive 
Vice President, Member Regulation Programs (Jan. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p4197 
10.pdf. 
 178. For example, FINRA and the SEC issued a joint guidance on effective practices for 
broker-dealers’ internal inspections of branches. See, e.g., FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 11-54, 
Branch Office inspections (Nov. 2011) (attaching a copy of the joint FINRA-SEC risk alert on 
the topic). 
 179. In its release on the new suitability rule, for example, FINRA referred to the policies 
behind the rule. See FINRA, Know Your Customer and Suitability, supra note 42, at 1 (“The 
know-your-customer and suitability obligations are critical to ensuring investor protection and 
promoting fair dealing with customers and ethical sales practices.”). 
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the policies do not recede into the background when the notice 
turns to a description of the rules and the ways in which compliance 
with and supervision of the rules are to be implemented by firms. 
Rather, explaining and promoting the policies should become a 
major point of the notice as well as in the publicity and follow-up 
explanation surrounding it. The notice should thus direct 
compliance officers to bring the policies and standards to the 
foreground in particular business decisions targeted by the rules and 
make suggestions as to how this might be accomplished.180 SEC 
officials could do the same, emphasizing the importance of internal 
compliance in their speeches, in their approval of FINRA rules, and 
in any general pronouncements on broker-dealer conduct.181 
FINRA and the SEC must also rethink the role of the 
compliance officer as a part of the firm’s reporting system of 
violations to FINRA and the SEC, as well as to the DOJ. As noted 
above, a compliance officer monitors employees for compliance, 
follows up on red flags, and reports legal, regulatory, and ethical 
violations to supervisors.182 The supervisors then take action to 
address any violations and to prevent further ones, which may 
include reporting to FINRA and possibly to the SEC and DOJ.183 
The reporting of violations shows the effectiveness of the supervisory 
system and, as discussed above, is a defense for the supervisors and 
the firm against a charge of supervisory liability for the violation.184 
In addition, FINRA and SEC enforcement officials, as well as federal 
prosecutors, take a more accommodating position towards a firm 
 
 180. Again, to take the suitability example, in its initial rule release, FINRA spent 
considerable time discussing the new rule, its technical differences from the old, and issues 
relating to implementation, but little time on the policies. Certainly, compliance officials, firms, 
and brokers need to understand how to implement the rule. See id. But if FINRA itself puts 
little emphasis on the policies of investor protection and fair dealing as orienting the 
application of the rule, it is likely that firms and compliance officers will take the same 
approach in its implementation. And the rule soon becomes a set of steps to follow, rather than 
an effort to serve the client. 
 181. As the SEC’s examination of broker-dealers is less extensive than FINRA’s and more 
targeted to risky firms, the SEC also establishes examination priorities and internal compliance 
could become one of them. See SEC OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND 
EXAMINATIONS, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2013 (Feb. 21, 2013). 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. In addition, under the Exchange Act, 
control liability would arise under Section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), but the controlling party 
has a “good faith” defense which can be satisfied in the same way as the defense to supervisory 
liability—having an effective supervisory system. 
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with respect to its own liability when it reports violations and assists 
in the investigations of them.185 Indeed, if a broker-dealer is a public 
firm, compliance officers may feel particular pressure to start the 
reporting process since a relatively new law and regulation governing 
whistleblowers do not require a whistleblower to report a potential 
violation internally. Furthermore, a firm wants to avoid a situation 
where an employee or someone else, rather than the firm itself, 
reports such a violation to regulators or prosecutors.186 
Yet having a compliance officer as part of the reporting structure 
for violations and ultimately a participant in enforcement conflicts 
with his or her role as a promoter of internal compliance. This latter 
role requires that a compliance officer be a close advisor to 
employees and be trusted by them so that they are willing to raise 
difficult matters with the officer. As other scholars have analyzed 
well, that function is undermined by employees’ perception that a 
compliance officer’s goal is to protect supervisors and the firm by 
providing information about them to supervisors and ultimately to 
regulators and prosecutors.187 Fearing that any information shared 
with compliance officers will be reported “up the chain,” employees 
will be less open and more reluctant to consult with them. Indeed, 
 
 185. This generally means that the prosecutor or the enforcement official does not 
prosecute the firm or defers prosecution of it because of the firm’s cooperation in investigating 
the misconduct by its employees. See generally SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL (Mar. 9, 2012) (setting forth policies relating to and grounds for entering into 
cooperation, deferred, and non-prosecution agreements); DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 9–28 (giving credit arises from 
cooperation, which means, among other things, disclosure of the relevant fact and taking of 
remedial action); FINRA, REG. NOTICE NO. 08-70, FINRA INVESTIGATION: FINRA 
PROVIDES GUIDANCE REGARDING CREDIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY COOPERATION (Nov. 2008) 
(defining such cooperation as (1) self-reporting of violation, (2) extraordinary steps to fix 
deficient procedures or systems, (3) extraordinary remediation to customers, or (4) providing 
substantial assistance to FINRA investigations). 
 186. The whistleblowing provision is pursuant to Section 21F of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6, added by Section 922 of Dodd-Frank. The SEC implemented this provision 
in Rule 21F, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1 to 21F-17. 
 187. See generally John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting 
Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 507, 517 (2008) (noting conflicts between 
command and control and self-regulatory approach). See also SIFMA, supra note 49, at 30 
(cautioning regulators against “deputizing” compliance officers as their agents); Vass, supra 
note 49, at 10 (“To the greatest extent possible, regulators should avoid directly using the 
work product of Compliance personnel in proceedings against firms or their officers or 
employees. If firms’ officers or employees perceive this to be likely, they may react to 
Compliance initiatives and inquiries with suspicion and reluctance to provide complete 
cooperation and candid responses.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 5:28 PM 
1121 Surveillant and Counselor 
 1179 
social psychologists emphasize that the most effective diffusion of 
models of ethical conduct and decision making comes from those 
whom we perceive to be part of our social group.188 In sum, the 
reporting and potential enforcement roles of the compliance officer 
thus reinforce his or her position as part of external compliance.189 
There is no question that the SEC and FINRA (as well as the 
DOJ) will always expect broker-dealers, their employees, and, by 
extension, compliance officers to report serious violations of the law. 
Therefore, just as a firm must maintain its external compliance for 
psychological deterrence, it must have compliance officers report 
these violations to supervisors and to FINRA and the SEC where 
necessary. But to promote the reorientation toward internal 
compliance, the SEC and FINRA could emphasize that generally 
discipline is the responsibility of supervisors in the firm rather than of 
compliance officers. At a minimum, the SEC should clarify that, in 
the absence of very special circumstances, compliance officers are not 
supervisors, which would clearly disassociate the former from the 
latter role and its disciplinary implications.190 In addition, both the 
SEC and FINRA should state that compliance does not typically 
have an enforcement role with respect to potential violations of the 
law, regulation, or professional standards (other than calling 
supervisors’ attention to problems or “red flags”); that role lies with 
 
 188. See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior, 
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 394 (2009) (finding that cheating is significantly influenced by a 
person’s social identification with the cheater (i.e., if the cheater is part of one’s social group), 
with the opposite happening if the cheater is perceived to be an outsider; thus emphasizing the 
importance of the peer group in ethical conduct). 
 189. The issue of reporting to authorities raises an issue beyond the scope of this article—
the dangers of an increased role of enforcement in the regulation of financial and other firms, 
as evidenced by the increased criminalization of business conduct. This has been ably dealt 
with by other scholars. For an early and valuable work on this subject, which is timely today, 
see ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1981). Concerns about deterring 
prosecution thus “crowd out” other forms of regulation of conduct in a firm. See generally 
Miriam Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 
19 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 190. See supra note 36. The SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets recently issued a 
Frequently Asked Questions About Liability of Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker-Dealers 
under Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision-093013.htm. The 
SEC staff echoed its position that compliance and legal personnel are not per se supervisors, 
but that this status “depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case, that person has the requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect the 
conduct of the employee whose behavior is at issue.” Id. Importantly, the staff did suggest that 
a compliance officer does not become a supervisor when exercising his or her advisory role. 
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another firm control function, such as the legal department.191 
Admittedly if, as a result of his or her monitoring, a compliance 
officer reports a potential violation to a supervisor, he or she is 
starting the enforcement process. However, the goal here is to 
eliminate the factors that tie the officer too closely to enforcement 
while recognizing that the compliance officer has the typical 
reporting obligation of any employee. 
The SEC and FINRA must also demonstrate that firms are 
rewarded for successfully implementing internal compliance. The 
most concrete measure is to take into consideration a firm’s internal 
compliance when they are considering whether to bring, or are 
actually bringing, a supervisory liability charge against it. The SEC 
and FINRA, as well as the DOJ, have policies in place to reward a 
firm for its supervisory system when evaluating its supervisory 
liability, and they assert that they pursue a supervisory liability charge 
only when there are specific grounds for it.192 It would be 
particularly useful as a way of promoting internal compliance if, in 
specific enforcement actions other than in cases of widespread 
misconduct, the SEC and FINRA gave some credit to the firm, as 
well as to firm supervisors, for the firm’s internal compliance. The 
credit approach can be done without undermining external 
compliance, the failure of which may be the basis for the supervisory 
liability (e.g., the absence of a WSP, the failure to carry out specific 
procedures of a WSP) and which will have to be corrected. The 
credit would take the form of lessening the penalty for the 
supervisory violation based on a failure of external compliance. In 
awarding credit for internal compliance, if it is appropriate, the SEC 
and FINRA can take the opportunity to highlight features of a 
targeted firm’s internal compliance that justified the credit (or its 
denial), which will further guide firms on its implementation.193 
  
 
 191. Firms themselves must try to separate these roles clearly, which can be challenging 
since some compliance personnel also function as legal officers. See SIFMA, The Evolving Role 
of Compliance, supra note 49, at 8–9. 
 192. See supra note 185. 
 193. Indeed, as discussed earlier, it was through its administrative decisions that the SEC 
indicated to firms what would constitute an adequate compliance system. See supra text 
accompanying notes 33–36. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues for a reorientation in the role of the 
compliance officer in broker-dealers as a way to promote internal 
compliance among employees in these firms and, ultimately, to 
create more investor confidence in broker-dealers and in the financial 
system. Part I first discussed the history and evolution of compliance, 
with reference to its statutory, regulatory, and FINRA basis, which 
was designed to assist supervisors and the firm in their statutory duty 
to enforce the federal securities laws, regulations, and industry 
standards. It then reviewed the current state of compliance and the 
typical tasks of compliance officers, who produce detailed WSPs, 
monitor firm employees for compliance with them, and report any 
violations within the supervisory structure of the firm. 
Part II discussed the problems with this external approach. It 
explained that this approach is an example of the techniques of 
“soft” power and control that emerged from the Enlightenment and 
that have been used in many domains both to control individuals 
and to make them more productive. Yet this “panopticon” 
perspective not only provokes resistance from the subject of the 
discipline, but also presents an unattainable model of total oversight 
and control of the targeted individuals. The Part then explained how 
the external approach, while necessary as an outer bound to prevent 
illegality and ethical abuses, is not psychologically effective if it is the 
sole model of compliance, particularly in financial services like 
brokerage, since financial professionals like brokers need to have 
discretion to make decisions on behalf of customers and otherwise to 
be productive. External compliance, albeit an integral part of the 
securities business, risks being seen by business employees as external 
to their business identity, which can lead them to feel justified in 
ignoring or gaming the laws, rules, and standards that compliance 
enforces—the very opposite result compliance systems intend to 
produce. In addition, external compliance squeezes out other 
approaches, despite the pronouncements by the SEC and FINRA in 
favor of the culture of compliance. Moreover, as the Part showed, 
this estrangement of compliance from the business of broker-dealers 
can produce adverse consequences because the recent financial crisis 
revealed problems in firms with detailed compliance systems. Despite 
these problems with the external orientation, however, Congress, the 
SEC, and FINRA are reinforcing and extending the model of 
external compliance, which imposes heavy regulatory burdens upon 
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broker-dealers that adversely affect their vibrancy, flexibility, and 
competitiveness. 
Part III argued for a reorientation toward internal compliance in 
broker-dealers and suggested how the change can be achieved. 
Instead of being only the producer and monitor of compliance with 
WSPs, compliance officers must emphasize their role as a counselor 
and promoter of a compliance culture, which means foregrounding 
the policies behind the securities laws and regulations and 
professional and even ethical standards. In doing this compliance, 
officers would play a major role in changing the decision framework 
for business employees so that these policies and ethics do not 
“fade” in business decisions. The Part reviewed ways in which 
compliance officers can promote this internal compliance and also 
contended that this changed emphasis requires the assistance of 
FINRA and the SEC. This Part recognized that FINRA and the SEC 
would resist this change, which is contrary to their established 
approach and which risks making them seem soft towards the 
securities industry. 
Part III concluded by arguing that this resistance might be 
overcome by showing the SEC and FINRA ways to measure the 
effectiveness of the internal approach, which could then be tried in a 
multi-year pilot program. It recommended that, after a suitable 
period of initiation, FINRA and the SEC evaluate whether instances 
of institutionalized misconduct in firms, branches, or significant 
divisions declined as a result of internal compliance. The Part also 
recommended that FINRA and the SEC conduct surveys of 
brokerage employees and customers as to whether the culture of 
firms changed as a result of reorienting compliance towards an 
internal approach. The Part then discussed the possibility that the 
SEC could promote internal compliance through a policy statement 
and particularly recommended that FINRA propose the 
reorientation in new supplementary material to an existing 
supervisory rule, which will provide the reorientation with express 
regulatory authority as well as allow potential problems with the 
approach to surface. The Part then discussed how FINRA and the 
SEC could promote internal compliance, for example, by 
emphasizing policies in their rule making. Finally, the Part made 
several suggestions about how FINRA and the SEC could lessen the 
enforcement role of compliance, which is an impediment to internal 
compliance, in particular by clearly separating compliance from 
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supervision and by giving firms credit for internal compliance in 
enforcement decisions. 
This Article recognizes the growing importance of compliance in 
broker-dealers while arguing that a continuation of the current 
external approach needs to be supplemented with an internal one. 
Under the external approach, WSPs will be piled upon other WSPs 
until they risk being followed in a routine way and occasionally 
disregarded or gamed. Compliance, as currently configured, has the 
unique advantage of being present throughout the financial firm, at 
all layers and in every business. In a time of government deficits and 
regulatory limitations, compliance is available to help achieve the 
goals and policies of the laws, regulations, and professional standards 
governing broker-dealers, which are ultimately social ones. But 
compliance has to be reoriented to promote internal compliance if it 
is to have this valuable effect. 
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